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JPRS L/8969

11 March 1980

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 668



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS	
Olympic Games Boycott Discussed (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Jan 80).....	1
Arguments Against Boycott, by Jean-Louis Buchet Politicizing of Games Criticized, by Abdelaziz Dahmani	
Libyan-Malian Problems Discussed After Traore's Statements (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 13 Feb 80).....	6
Report on FAC Credits to Various Countries (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80)....	8
Report on CILSS Meeting on Poor Agricultural Campaign in Sahel (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80)....	10
Creation of Power Agency Studied by Club de Dakar (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Jan 80)....	12
Briefs	
Gabonese Gift to Chad	15
Egyptian-Senegalese Educational Cooperation	15
Mauritanian-Senegalese Cooperation Agreements	15
ANGOLA	
Agriculture Ministry Reports Generalized Deficiencies (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 Feb 80).....	16

- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]

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## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Briefs	
Embassy Inaugurated	18
Revolutionary Council Meeting	18
Portugal Nationalizes Angolan Stock	18
Reported French Visa for Holden	19
Trade With France Reviewed	19
CAMEROON	
Census Figures for 1976 Reported, Analyzed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	20
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	
Political, Economic Effects of Bokassa's Departure Noted (Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79).....	25
Briefs	
Government Seeks Bokassa Properties	31
Private Sector Regains Some Control	31
Stricter Press Control	31
CHAD	
Fighting Breaks Out in Ouaddai (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	32
COMORO ISLANDS	
Briefs	
Airline Ownership	33
CONGO	
Additional Economic Program Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80).....	34
National Development Bank's Capital Increased (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	35
Briefs	
Marchais Visit Divides PCT	37
PCT Membership	37

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
1980 Budget Data	37
Shipyards Expansion	38
Details on 'IDA' Petroleum Loan	38
New Hydro-Congo Director	38
Details on PRC Constructed Dam	38
PRC Constructed Dam	38
 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	
Briefs	
ABD Loan	39
PRC Relations	39
PRC Strengthens Diplomatic Position	39
 GABON	
Bongo Regime Under Fire for Corruption, Human Rights Violations	
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 7 Jan 80).....	40
French Participation, by Elie Ramaro	
Alleged Macchiavellian Policies, by San Fie	
Bongo's Alleged Fortune	
Rules, Regulations for Legislative Elections	
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	46
 GUINEA-BISSAU	
Briefs	
CCCE Agricultural Loan	48
 KENYA	
Problems in Wild Animal Protection	
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80).....	49
 LIBERIA	
Probate Court Officially Recognizes PPP	
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	50

- c -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
<b>MALI</b>	
Economic Woes Compounded Following Student Unrest (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Feb 80).....	52
<b>MAURITIUS</b>	
Briefs	54
Emergency Aid	
<b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>	
Construction of Powerplant in Quelimane Almost Completed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	55
Briefs	56
Geological Research	56
Cement Production	56
<b>NIGER</b>	
CCCE Grants Five Loans to Niger (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	57
Briefs	59
Belgian Project Compromised	59
ADB Loan	59
Rice Cultivation Grant	59
New Taxes	59
<b>NIGERIA</b>	
Economic Objectives Reviewed by Envoy to Belgium (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80)....	60
<b>SENEGAL</b>	
Briefs	63
New Rural Communities	64
Petroleum, Iron for Horizon 1985	64
French Financing Agreements	64
<b>SOMALIA</b>	
Need To Reestablish Balance of Power Stressed (Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Feb 80).....	65

- d -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
SWAZILAND	
Economic Situation Reviewed in Bank Report (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Jan 80).....	67
TANZANIA	
Possible Break in Diplomatic Relations With Britain (THE GUARDIAN, 25 Feb 80).....	70
Institute of Rural Planning Established (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80)....	72
Report on Tazara Corridor Development (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80)....	73
Briefs	
Rise in Food Prices	75
'IDA' Port Modernization Loan	75
New Ministry Created	75
UGANDA	
European Aid Since Fall of Amin Dada Explained (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Jan 80).....	76

- e -

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OLYMPIC GAMES BOYCOTT DISCUSSED

Arguments Against Boycott

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 p 31

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "Yes, But"]

[Text] This is not the first time a great sports demonstration has been organized in a country that is not very scrupulous about human rights. Nor is it the first time an Olympic year has begun with an international aggression. But, for the first time a country that does not respect human rights is behaving like an aggressor on the eve of welcoming the Olympic games.

That is a peculiarity sufficiently loaded with consequences to bring one to a halt on the matter of the current campaign in favor of boycotting the Moscow Olympics. Before the "Kabul coup" the campaign was being waged amid general indifference by Soviet dissidents, with the support of a few Western circles. The boycott being for them a means of attracting the attention of international public opinion to the totalitarian system in the USSR. And the Afghan affair only serves to confirm their theses: if the Soviet government does not respect the rights of its citizens, why would it respect those of neighboring peoples? Jimmy Carter has come to take over and expand this campaign. The USSR's internal situation is of little importance to him. The fate of the Afghan people is of no more concern to him. But the "Kabul coup," he states, is too much. Soviet arrogance, the Kremlin's ambitions, worry him.

Throwing all his weight into the balance, the American president in this electoral year can give the watchword boycott, which has barely been whispered in several weeks, a chance of success. In contrast to what happened two years ago, for example, at the football World Cup in Argentina: those who were hoping to have the Videla regime outlawed by the nations had no chance of bringing it off. It is at least as curious to see the Americans demanding what they have always refused, from Berlin in 1936 to Buenos Aires in 1978, by way of Montreal in 1976--the politization of sports.

Of course, if Leonid Brezhnev were to be deprived of his games the Kremlin would suffer a resounding failure. But this would also be the end of the world Olympic movement, with no guarantee that the USSR would change. The

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Soviet government would not prove to be more respectful of individual freedom or of the independence of other states. Just the opposite, perhaps.

The Olympics must be held in Moscow. That is, the present campaign makes it possible to recall that the USSR--even though it is not alone in this case--is an expansionist power that can threaten world peace. This campaign is also giving second wind to those who are legitimately concerned about human rights in the "homeland of socialism." Even if nothing were to change, it would be good for the great mass of "apolitical" sportsmen to become aware, as happened with Argentina, of the realities. This is why it is necessary to go to Moscow. But with no illusions.

Politicizing of Games Criticized

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 27-31

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "It is Necessary to go to Moscow"]

[Text] By "politicizing" the Olympic games, Jimmy Carter is choosing a new terrain for the battle against the USSR. The boycott of the Moscow games is in danger of being fatal to the world Olympic movement and African sports.

After the food weapon, the Olympic weapon? Does Jimmy Carter have to be followed in his campaign in favor of boycotting the Moscow Olympic games, which are to take place from 19 July to 3 August 1980?

These are the crucial questions being asked today of all the world's youth, sports leaders and the governments of over 100 states. The Olympic movement includes 141 countries, but if we exclude the unquestioning supporters of the Soviet Union, there are 100 nations that cannot evade the question. The battle is already engaged, especially since the United Nations' unequivocal condemnation of the "Kabul coup" (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 994). But it is not certain that the same majority will break loose to integrate the Olympic games boycott with the reprisals package.

Jimmy Carter has chosen a bad terrain. To defend Afghanistan's independence is certainly praiseworthy. But there must be other ways than the Olympics to put pressure on the USSR. Throughout four years these games give us an opportunity to exalt the sports fraternity. It is a festival that mobilizes men from the four corners of the world, thanks especially to modern broadcasting technology. So we applaud the exploit of an athlete from--it makes no difference where--Oklahoma, Siberia, Scandinavia, Ceylon or Kenya. To boycott the Olympic games is first of all to penalize all who take part in the festival, with athletic youth at the head of the list.

It is true that Carter is asking the Moscow, the locale of the games, be boycotted, not the competition itself. He suggests that the 1980 Olympics be transferred to another (or several) capital or large city, Montreal, Munich or Mexico, for example, which organized the last three Olympiads and therefore

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possess the necessary infrastructures. But that would be to create a dangerous precedent that might sound the death knell of the Olympic games. The danger is that they may permanently escape the control of the "Olympic government," the famous IOC (International Olympic Committee), which has always striven, not without success, to maintain international sports apart from the great political upheavals. Those who are threatening Moscow today risk being threatened in turn when the next games, which are to take place in 1984 in Los Angeles in the United States, are organized.

Of course, we can only hope for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But is that possible? Carter's appeal looks like an ultimatum that expires in one month, on 20 February, and no one imagines that the USSR will give in to it.

Why Condemn the Africans?

On the other hand, Carter is staking his reelection in November 1980 on this affair. If the Olympic games are held in Moscow and achieve the anticipated success, this will be a crushing defeat for him. Today, American public opinion is behind its president--over 70 percent, according to the latest polls. Carter has the support of many national organizations, including the powerful AFL-CIO union federation (over 15,000,000 members), and even, it seems, a large part of the American sports elite. How will it be tomorrow, if he weakens, or if he emerges a loser from this formidable game of Indian wrestling with the Soviet Union?

Jimmy Carter has undoubtedly gained some sympathy abroad. The active sympathy of Great Britain's prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, who is frankly in favor of the boycott; more tempered, the sympathy of Japan, West Germany, Australia and Canada, great sports powers whose abstention can compromise the success of the games.

But why has the United States adopted such an attitude? Are not the United States, Great Britain and Australia the only countries to have participated in all the summer Olympic games, the only ones that have always refused to have politics mixed up with sports? As, notably, in the last Olympics in Montreal in 1976, when the African countries brandished the boycott weapon to protest the presence of New Zealand, which was guilty of maintaining sports relations with South Africa and Rhodesia.

The United States and Great Britain, like Canada, the organizing country, rose up energetically against the African position. Certain delegates even demanded sanctions. And the Africans came very close to being excluded from the games. Westerners definitely have very short memories.

One Objective: to Avoid the Worst

Let us not be taken in. Politics and the power struggle are never totally absent from the Olympics. But the inflexibility of those in charge of the Olympics, whether it be a firebrand type like President Avery Brundage, or a

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liberal type like his successor Lord Killanin, has made it possible to avoid the irreparable. Only the two world wars have prevented three modern Olympiads from taking place: 1916 (scheduled for Berlin), then 1940 and 1944. We add, to complete the record, that the countries vanquished in those wars were forbidden to participate in the Olympics of 1920 and 1924 (Germany) and 1948 (Germany and Japan).

Countries have also been quarantined, China for instance, then called "Peking China," which left the Olympic movement in 1956 because it was not resigned to the presence of the "other" China. But never before has anyone directly attacked the organization of the games.

A Threat That Would be Fatal to African Sports

Violence within and around the Olympics has nonetheless not stopped them from taking place. In Mexico in 1968 300 students were massacred in Three Cultures Square on the eve of the opening. In Munich four years later there was the abduction of the Israeli athletes, followed by a shootout that cost the lives of 11 of them, five Palestinian commandos and two West German policemen.

And the Africans in all this? Even though, thanks by the way to the support of black American athletes, they managed to get Rhodesia excluded from Munich, they must not forget that their absence from Montreal, especially in track and boxing (where they had real possibilities of winning medals), lowered the level of their athletes. It is not certain that even today they have retrieved the value they had in Munich, where they won many medals, especially the Kenyans. A second boycott risks dealing a fatal blow to African sports.

To Prevent a Division

Another threat: the threat of seeing the Africans choose sides, as they did in the United Nations on 14 January. Those who were against the boycott in Montreal (roughly the ones called "moderate") are going to oppose the participation defended by the "progressives." Africa can really prevent a new division. But do the CSSA (Higher Sports Council in Africa) and its new secretary general, Lamine Ba, have the means of preventing a break? Egypt and Kenya have already announced their potential withdrawal. This is enormously important. For Egypt and Kenya together have won 11 of the 16 gold medals that make up Africa's Olympic history.

Only 16! Whereas the United States has run off with 628 and the Soviets 258, with this interesting point, that the Soviets' first gold medal goes back to 1952, the year of the 15th games.

And if despite everything the IOC were to give in to the partisans of the boycott--a very unlikely eventuality, by the way--, the world Olympic movement would come to an end with the withdrawal of the socialist side. For now, Lord Killanin is showing firmness: "There is no question," declares the president of the IOC, "of transferring the games." Mohamed Mzali, Tunisian minister of Education and first vice president of the IOC, is hoping that "attitudes will

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calm down between now and 26 May, the closing date for registering for the Moscow Olympics." Mr Mzali is just back from a tour of the Middle East, where he found Olympic committees sensitized by Saudi Arabia to the idea of boycotting.

Threats of a Split on the IOC

The IOC is going to try to look into the matter more thoroughly after 13 February in Lake Placid (United States), where the winter games are to take place, with Soviet athletes participating. The Olympic leaders intend to remain firm with the American authorities with whom they will meet at that time. They will do the same with the Soviets, who are not making their task easier by "exiling" Andrei Sakharov several weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan.

Will the IOC manage to maintain the unity of the Olympic movement? If tomorrow the games of the "free world" were organized in opposition to the "socialist side," no one would win. Beginning with Africa, which would be in danger of being rejected by both sides.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

LIBYAN-MALIAN PROBLEMS DISCUSSED AFTER TRAORE'S STATEMENTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 997, 13 Feb 80 p 36

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Mali Awaits Qadhdhafi..."]

[Text] "It is with great sorrow that we learned about the plot against Tunisia.... Less than a year ago, Libya organized a similar act against Mali. It is still harboring and training Malian mercenaries and terrorists."

Thus spoke the head of the Malian Government in Tunis on 4 February. Gen Moussa Traore knew what he was talking about. In September 1979, JEUNE AFRIQUE had revealed the existence of a movement, the Democratic Republican Union of Mali (UDRM), headed by a Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou. Having taken refuge in Libya, he was claiming to have at his disposal, with Colonel Qadhdhafi's support, an army of 7,000 men.

On the eve of his departure for Baghdad via Tunis, we had asked President Traore if, in his opinion, we had been right in publishing Didi Soumbounou's statements. He replied: "You were helpful, not only to Mali, but to Africa as well." Indeed, following these disclosures, Qadhdhafi dispatched an emissary to Bamako, who was supposed to protest about Qadhdhafi's good intentions and to promise that Didi Soumbounou would be extradited, given the fact that the man was also wanted by Malian police for civil offenses. Bamako then sent a mission to Tripoli to bring the "culprit" back. However, at the last minute, Qadhdhafi changed his mind and did not even receive the delegation.

However, since October 1979, new measures have been adopted in Mali. The Kidal military base, at the far end of the Southern Sahara, has received reinforcements. This does not mean, of course, that concern was overwhelming. It was said at the time: "Let Soumbounou come, we are ready for him." Even today, the same determination prevails.

There is one unknown factor. On the issue of the Sahara and the formation of the "Islamic United States of the Sahel," would Qadhdhafi stand a chance to have the ear of the Touareg of the Malian north, whose long

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revolt of the sixties has not yet been forgotten? Today, things have changed. A Tamasheq student told us: "Qadhdhafi is wrong if he wants to use a pseudo-ethnic argument. We are not Arabs, we are Kel Tamasheq, those whom the Arabs call Touareg."

It appears, then, that Qadhdhafi is far from being popular among the Malians, to the extent that, in the higher reaches of government, they speak of his "machivelism," and they are "ready to confront him." The wait might be quite long. Qadhdhafi is supposed to come to Mali from 2 to 9 March to take part in the summit of the Sahara riparian states. Meanwhile, Moussa Traore, for his part, will have met in Niamey as of 17 February his Nigerian counterpart, Lt Col Seyni Kountche. Niger has also been coveted for a long time by the Libyan colonel. The two Sahelian presidents have not forgotten the reality of the present, notably these territorial problems. This is doubtlessly why President Moussa Traore told us: "Qadhdhafi may come to Bamako. We shall listen to what he has to say." But will Qadhdhafi come to Bamako?

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REPORT ON FAC CREDITS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 116

[Report: "FAC Credits: 27.9 Million for Overall Projects and 155 Million for the States"]

[Text] The Administrative Committee of the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) decided in its last meeting chaired by Robert Galley, minister of cooperation, to participate with an overall investment of close to 27.9 million French francs in the financing of several projects concerning the following:

- Development of fishing resources;
- Building of small steel smelting plants;
- Industrialization of electronic materials;
- Urgent aid to the Sahel (5 million francs).

In terms of the development of fishing resources, the French ministry emphasized that the development of laguna fishing offered substantial possibilities for the harvesting of sea crops and maritime fishing.

The Ministry of Cooperation and the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) would also like to initiate a general consideration of the formulation of a strategy for the development of small scale metallurgy in Africa.

A number of development operations totaling close to 155 million francs have been appropriated, on the other hand, for states within the area of competence of the Ministry of Cooperation (in French francs):

- Benin: participation in the expansion of the port of Cotonou (4 million francs).
- Burundi: delivery of a self-propelling barge for haulage on Tanganyika Lake (10 million) and a ground satellite communications station (6 million).
- Central Africa: aid to Central African civil air transport (1 million); modernization of the Bangui National Hospital Center (1.7 million).

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- Congo: participation in the correction of the Congo-Ocean railroad tracks (12 million).
- Gabon: installation of a transmitter in Moyabi (4.3 million).
- Upper Volta: sinking of wells and drilling in the Sahel (5 million).
- Madagascar: aid to the National Laboratory of Public Works and Construction (3 million).
- Mali: Selingue Dam (1 million 650,000 francs) and supplying the town of Gao with drinking water (5.5 million).
- Mauritius: establishment of a polytechnical high school (4 million).
- Mauritania: fishing research (6.5 million).
- Niger: Niger television (18 million), and a telecommunications and television network (20 million).
- Rwanda: work on the Kigali-Kanombe International Airport (5 million).
- Senegal: development of the valley of the Senegal river (5.2 million) and participating in the building of the University of Saint Louis (10 million).
- Seychelles: vegetable and fruit pilot farm (2 million) and hotel management school (5 million).
- Chad: hospital medicine (1.6 million) and work at the Ndjamena Ground Telecommunications Station (6 million).
- Togo: expansion of the national press (3.5 million).
- Zaire: development of livestock breeding in Ituri (3 million).
- Equatorial Guinea: development of traditional fishing (1 million), mineral prospecting (2 million), and Malabo Port (8 million).

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REPORT ON CILSS MEETING ON POOR AGRICULTURAL CAMPAIGN IN SAHEL

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 116

[Report: "Sahel, International Aid More Necessary Than Ever"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Permanent Interstate Committee for the Struggle Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) met in Ouagadougou between 10 and 12 January, under the chairmanship of Djibril Sene, Senegal minister of rural development and minister coordinator of the committee.

The council's resolutions, recommendations, and appeals concern the following:

The deficit of the 1979-1980 agricultural campaign, assessed at over 870,000 tons;

The formulation of a policy for food security and cereal crops and of stockpiling commodities on the level of the individual member countries and on the regional level;

The initiation of test projects for the food volunteers corps;

Struggle against desertification for which the CILSS has approved a plan, revised with the help of the United Nations Sahel Bureau (UNSO) and the Sahel Club Secretariat. The problem being closely linked with that of the energy policy in the Sahel, the council heard a report by Khalilou Sal, a CILSS consultant, which emphasized the severe danger of desertification facing the Sahel;

Reinforcement of Sahelian structures both on the national and regional levels, in the essential areas of planning, management, and assessment of projects and the strengthening of the national CILSS committees;

Recurrent costs of Sahel development projects;

Activities of the two specialized CILSS institutions, the Agrhymet Center, in Niamey and the Sahel Institute in Bamako. Measures were taken to

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enable these two institutions to effectively carry out their mission.

While acknowledging that real efforts have been made by the international community, the Council of Ministers, nevertheless, emphasized that the pace of implementation of the program is not satisfactory, particularly taking into consideration inflation and fiscal erosion.

Finally, it called upon the international community to come to the aid of populations which, once again this year, were affected by the drought, with the wish that food transport problems be given a favorable consideration by the donors. The problem of saving the herds threatened in several areas by the deterioration of pastures and the drying up of water holes should also be considered.

This 12th CILSS Session was attended by the ministers of rural development of Cape Verde, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, the minister of agriculture and natural resources of Gambia, and the ministers of agriculture and of land management and natural disasters of Chad. The council decided to hold its next meeting in Niamey in the first half of June 1980.

This new appeal to the international community should be heard, for the food situation in the area threatens to be even more dramatic this year because of the poor agricultural campaign. Djibril Sene, minister coordinator of the CILSS recently supplied figures worth thinking about.

In Cape Verde the entire crop did not exceed 10,000 tons of corn and 2,000 tons of beans, or 8 percent of a normal annual output. Urgent food requirements are assessed at 42,460 tons.

In Gambia, the peanut crop dropped 43 percent compared with 1978 while cereal crops dropped 33.3 percent. A total of 32,250 tons of cereals are urgently needed.

In Mali the deficit is provisionally assessed at 259,000 tons of millet, corn, and rice.

In Mauritania, compared with 1978 the drop amounted to 50 percent and the output would be sufficient to meet no more than one-sixth of requirements.

In Senegal, where a substantial shortage exists considering the overall need for cereal crops totaling 1 million 250,000 tons, the situation is not good but is less catastrophic than with some other CILSS members.

Following the meeting on the ministerial level, a summit meeting of heads of states of the CILSS opened on 14 January in Ouagadougou under the presidency of Sir Dawda Jawara, president of the Republic of Gambia, and current president of the CILSS. The conference was to last two days.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CREATION OF POWER AGENCY STUDIED BY CLUB DE DAKAR

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 182

[Text] During its annual general assembly, held in West Berlin on 26 and 27 November 1979 (see Issue No. 1777, 30 November 1979), the Club de Dakar discussed mainly William Blackwell's report on the development of energy in Africa.

The Third World's economic development depends heavily on the availability of appropriate energy sources for turning its mineral and agricultural potential to profit. Economic growth seems especially necessary to Africa. Out of the 54 nations or territories included in geographical Africa, 25 are listed by the World Bank under the low-income countries group, those whose gross national product per capita does not exceed 250 dollars.

Currently, Africa represents nearly 10 percent of the world population and almost 18 percent of the entire Third World population. Its population, estimated at 426 million in mid-1975, is expected to reach between 818 and 853 million by the year 2000 at an average annual growth rate between 2.7 and 2.9 percent, or almost double the rate set for world demographic growth.

Although there is still great uncertainty about coal, oil and natural gas reserves in Africa, these resources, exploited or potential, are unevenly distributed. It is wise to keep in mind the following elements:

- a) Africa's oil resources -- 80 percent of which are exported off the continent -- will be exhausted in 25 years at the current rate of production, although there may be variations from one place to another.
- b) For some natural gas exploitations, there has been and sometimes still is a problem of gas escaping at the well site.
- c) As for South Africa's coal deposits, they are either insufficient for the needs of heavy industry or too small for long-term exploitation.

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d) In Africa there are immense deposits of bituminous shale and oil-bearing sand, unexploited to date because of cost/productivity ratios.

e) The use of wood and plant matter for energy is a growing threat to the ecological balance of the area, especially climatologically, and from now on strict regulation for its protection is imperative.

Though the revenues earned from oil exports are extremely important for the nations concerned, continuing the exploitation at the current rate is likely to weigh heavily in time and impose severe restraints on those countries' development. Moreover, the revenues earned from exporting crude oil do not show the profit they could. They do not create added value. No matter how expensive from the point of view of the investment in equipment, exporting smaller amounts of refined products would be a source of more substantial revenues while making possible better conservation of oil reserves.

#### Exceptional Hydroelectric Potential

Africa offers more satisfying conditions in water and solar energy.

Africa's hydroelectric potential is one-third of the gross world potential, or 145,000 MW. Now, less than 8 percent of this potential has been exploited to date, or about 11,000 MW. Of the rest, 85 sites have been recorded and catalogued which represent 61,000 MW.

To maintain the current level of gross domestic product per capita (a 422-dollar average among all countries concerned), Africa's economic growth rate should, between now and the year 2000, be maintained at 2.8 or 2.9 percent per year. The development goals have been set by various international proceedings between 5.2 and 6 percent a year from now until the year 2000, as compared to the 3-percent average estimate set for all the industrialized countries.

It is obvious that the nations would like, individually or collectively, to rely on their own resources for their energy supply. Because of the differences in levels and types of demands for energy and the potentials in solar and geothermic energy, the recovery of methane, plant matter and hydroelectric energy, not to mention continuing the production of fossil fuel (coal, oil and natural gas), it seems necessary to institute a coordination, evaluation and forecast for energy resources and needs.

The financing of a coherent energy development program in Africa will require an average annual investment of about 253 to 266 billion dollars for the next 20 years.

The report presented to the Club de Dakar also advocates the creation of a first-stage Consultation Agency for the Development of Energy Resources. This agency would assume the following functions:

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- a) Estimation of local energy resources;
- b) Determination of future energy needs based on goals for agricultural and industrial production and the conditions for well-being defined in the national plans;
- c) Determination of means to authorize the satisfying of those needs;
- d) Drawing up of plans for energy profit development.

In a later stage, the Agency should be able to act with complete impartiality:

- a) In the conception of projects involving a demand for cash;
- b) As an advisor in the selection among offers tendered;
- c) As a coordinator in the setting up of consortiums which might become necessary;
- d) As manager and director of projects in behalf of governments;
- e) As an intermediary to guarantee and possibly set up financing for energy projects.

This task requires international technical and financial cooperation. It will be a concrete way for Africa to succeed in completing a decisive stage in its development and narrowing the chasm that separates it from the industrialized countries.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GABONESE GIFT TO CHAD--On 14 January Mahamat Saleh Ahhat, Chad's minister of finance, announced that Gabon has given 150,000,000 CFA [African Financial Community (monetary unit)] francs to Chad. The minister returned from Libreville where he had gone to seek "a loan under favorable conditions." He explained that his request "was not understood in the way he had hoped." Nonetheless, he told AFP [French Press Agency], President Bongo granted a subsidy of 150,000,000 CFA francs. "Under the difficult circumstances Chad is experiencing, it is not so much the amount but the gesture that one must appreciate," for Gabon is "the first African country to grant financial budgetary aid to Chad," Saleh stated. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 204] 8094

EGYPTIAN-SENEGALESE EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION--Senegal's needs in the sphere of teaching Arabic were examined during the recent visit of Ahmed Esmath Mahmoud, Egyptian under secretary of state in charge of al-Azahr University and of Islamic studies. In the area of education, Senegal already has the benefit of Egyptian technical assistance, including 17 Egyptian professors. On the other hand, Egypt has received 400 Senegalese, some 100 of whom attend al-Azahr University. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 193] 8094

MAURITANIAN-SENEGALESE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS--As a result of the 29 December meeting in Dakar of the two countries' Joint Cooperation Commission, Mauritania and Senegal have concluded an agreement on health and a protocol for cultural exchanges. As concerns health, the two countries will collaborate actively in the struggle against the major endemic diseases. In the cultural domain, they will organize regular cultural and artistic events, and exchange documents in research, news, students, and education. Mauritania and Senegal have agreed to develop cooperation in the areas of fishing, scientific research, postal services and telecommunications, transportation, tourism, and the movement of goods and people. Meetings of experts in these areas have been planned for 1980. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 78] 8860

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ANGOLA

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY REPORTS GENERALIZED DEFICIENCIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 399

[Text] The Angolan Ministry of Agriculture has published its 1979 activities report, which shows "a general deficiency in the state sector, mainly due to the lack of the technical and scientific know-how needed to implement the planned project for extensive and continuous cultivation of various areas." It should be remembered that the state agricultural sector in Angola comprises those plantations abandoned by their owners.

According to the 27-page document, Angola exported last year 62,600 tons of coffee despite the difficulties in processing this product. The state sector produced 18,771 tons of maize.

Palm oil production amounted to 5,000 tons (42 percent of planned goals). Contacts have been initiated with a Belgian company to implement a project for the development of palm oil production throughout the country.

The report specifies that sisal production amounted to 7,767 tons; tobacco production was 600 tons and bean production was 862 tons. It also reports that citrus fruit production amounted to 2,889 tons and mentions rice and wheat production, two non-traditional staples in Angola.

Another reason why most of the goals were not reached is the fact that delays occurred in the arrival of imported seeds, of necessary harvesting equipment and of the spare parts without which repairs cannot be effected. While the Angolan Ministry of Agriculture is on the verge of signing various agreements with Italian and Bulgarian companies to stimulate the activity in various sectors, it is also preparing a development plan aimed at producing 6,000 tons of pineapple in the immediate future and 80,000 tons of cotton in 1985.

In the livestock field, the Ministry reports that last year's consumption of beef amounted to 13,384 tons, which were distributed through the state structures. A total of 10,000 heads of cattle will be imported to restock herds in various sections of the country.

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A total of 300 milk cows and 75 bulls were purchased last year in Austria and 5,000 heads of cattle will be imported from this country in 1985, while 425 will arrive this year.

In the Cuanza-Bengo agricultural complex (Luanda region), a milk plant for 2,000 heads of cattle has been set up, and production is being distributed exclusively to hospitals, day nurseries and nursery schools.

The Angolan Ministry of Agriculture report notes that milk production for 1980 is pegged at 4,250 liters, or 85 percent of the objective set by the First MPLA-Labor Party Congress, thanks to the participation of a team of technicians from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CAME).

In regard to forestry resources, the Ministry of Agriculture marketed 33,000 cubic meters of wood last year.

The training program for technical cadres, so important for the future of the state agricultural sector, numbered 514 students in Angola and 91 others abroad.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

EMBASSY INAUGURATED--The Angolan Embassy in Paris was inaugurated on 4 February, 19 years to the day after the attack on the Luanda jail (4 February 1961) which marked the beginning of the armed struggle of the Angolans against the Portuguese. Maria Eugenia Neto, widow of the former president of Angola, unveiled a bust of the deceased leader in the presence of Dr Neto's daughter, brother and sister. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 336]

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING--During its 35th ordinary meeting held in Luanda on 25 January, the Angolan Council of the Revolution specifically reviewed the country's economic situation, as well as military and political conditions. The council approved the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed between Angola and the GDR, as well as that between Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, the council approved a law on bank regulations and the law regarding a general population census. Until now the supreme organ in Angola, the Council of the Revolution should be replaced this year by the People's Assembly. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 336]

PORTUGAL NATIONALIZES ANGOLAN STOCK--According to a 29 January decree of the Council of Ministers in Lisbon, 10 percent of the capital of the Sociedade Portuguesa de Lapidacao de Diamantes (DIALAP), which was held by the Angolan Government, was nationalized. The communique intimates that this nationalization was in response to the "clearly discriminatory nationalization" action undertaken by Luanda against Portuguese stockholders in the Angolan DIAMANG [Angola Diamond Company] announced on 26 January. Following this nationalization, the Angolan state holds 77.21 percent of the DIAMANG Company together with non-Portuguese foreign private investors whose holdings were left untouched. Lisbon expresses its regret about this "inimical" measure adopted by Luanda which, according to the Portuguese communique, will only give rise again to the dispute between Portugal and its former colony just at the time when "a phase of broad prospects was opening between the two countries." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 336]

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REPORTED FRENCH VISA FOR HOLDEN--According to reliable diplomatic sources, Roberto Holden, leader of the Angolan puppet organization FNLA, has reportedly been granted a 6-month visa by the French Embassy in Libreville, where he was residing following his expulsion from Dakar and Abidjan. Roberto Holden is reportedly living now in Neuilly in the Paris region, where several of his children are in school. This visa granted to Holden by France will doubtlessly give rise to justifiable indignation in Angolan public and official opinion, coming as it does on the heels of the opening of the People's Republic of Angola embassy in Paris. It is also to be noted that during his recent visit to Angola, Georgy had assured the Angolan Governemnt that Paris intended to develop its cooperation with Angola. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb-2 Mar 80 p 35]

TRADE WITH FRANCE REVIEWED--Last 7 December the French Center for Foreign Trade had organized a half-day news briefing on the People's Republic of Angola in which Mr Jacques Rigaud, commercial attache to the French Embassy in Luanda had participated. In the article MTM published on this occasion (No 1779, 14 Dec 79 p 3,478), the development of trade between France and Angola during the past years was briefly reviewed. It seems useful to discuss this subject here in somewhat greater detail. In 1976 French exports to Angola amounted to 44,990,000 FF and French imports from Angola amounted to 56,373,000 FF; there was a deficit of 11,383,000 FF. Since then the balance has turned to a surplus position of 114,466,000 FF in 1977 (162,679,000 FF in exports and 48,213,000 FF in imports), of 104,679,000 FF in 1978 (126,140,000 FF in exports and 21,859,000 FF in imports); of 86,850,000 FF in the first half of 1979 (97,051,000 FF in exports and 10,195,000 in imports). [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 156] 8860

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CAMEROON

CENSUS FIGURES FOR 1976 REPORTED, ANALYZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 pp 145-146

[Text] The numerical results of the 1976 census were published in 1978, but their dissemination was very limited, and they were not commented on for the benefit of the general public. We feel that a number of essential points may be of interest to our magazine's readers.

Total Population Over 7.6 Million

The census takers counted 7,131,833 persons living in Cameroon in April 1976, but that figure was adjusted to 7,661,000 (and then to 7,663,246 by presidential decree) because when the age pyramid was drawn up, it was noted in particular that there was a deficit of males between the ages of 15 and 50, chiefly through the omission of young men. Because of their mobility, the latter live temporarily in one place and then in another. They are also not reported as a means of evading taxes. The phenomenon of omission also occurred in the case of young women and children under 4 years of age. In other words, it is estimated that half a million persons were omitted in the raw census, or exactly 7.4 percent of that census.

Taking only the raw data into account, it is seen that there were 95.9 men for every 100 women, or 149,000 fewer men than women. Up to the age of 14, there were more boys than girls. From 15 to 54 years of age, the ratio is under 100, partly because of the omissions noted above. There are more men than women in the cities (107.7 percent), and fewer in the rural areas (91.7 percent), while 28.5 percent of the population lives in urban centers of more than 5,000 inhabitants.

Age Pyramid

The structure by age group is that of a developing country: the 0-14 age group represents 43.4 percent of the population, while 50.8 percent are between the ages of 15 and 59, and 5.8 percent are 60 and over.

Compared to the regional censuses of 1960-1965, the percentage of those under 14 years old increased, as did that of those 60 and older. In other

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words, the strata from which the active population is recruited are proportionately less numerous and carry a heavier burden. Two phenomena have combined to produce that effect: the sustained reproduction rate and increased longevity. This structure varies according to province. In Ouest Province (Bamileke country), those 14 and under represent 49.3 percent of the population and those 60 and over account for 5.3 percent, while the population of working age totals 45.4 percent due to migratory movements. It is probable that many children do not live under the authority of their fathers but with their mothers and grandparents.

In terms of percentages, persons 60 years of age and older are less numerous in the cities than in the rural areas, where they feel more comfortable. On the other hand, the age pyramid in urban areas is inflated for those between the ages of 15 and 40, while it is thinner in the rural areas (because of the rural exodus).

The unweighted pyramid of age by year, rather than by major group or 5-year group, resembles the very elaborate roof of a pagoda--a multiple-level roof. Persons giving their age as 25, for example, are more numerous than those saying they are between 21 and 24 years old, although in fact the young people are always more numerous than their elders. The same phenomenon occurs in the case of 30-year-olds as compared to those between 26 and 29 years of age, and so on. On the other hand, that bulge at the 5-year limit practically does not exist in the case of those under 10 years old, especially in the cities, where records are more precise. What has happened? Due to the lack of generalized recordkeeping in vital statistics, informants are unconsciously drawn to numbers ending in 0 and 5 and, on the other hand, they reject the intermediate numbers, particularly odd numbers other than 5. Thanks to the continuity of the demographic phenomenon, it was possible to correct that anomaly. It could also be seen why, in the pyramid, there was a "low spot" in the case of women between the ages of 10 and 19: for one thing, there is a tendency to omit or lower the age of unmarried adolescent girls, and for another, when an 18-year-old woman is married (or unmarried) with children, she is spontaneously made older to place her among those over 20 years of age.

#### Foreign Population

The foreign population officially totals 200,000 persons distributed as follows: Nigerians: 135,296 (67.7 percent of the foreigners); Chadians: 28,063 (14 percent); Central Africans: 12,432 (6.2 percent); French: 9,044 (4.5 percent); and others: 15,272 (7.6 percent).

The Europeans total 12,552 (9,044 French and 3,508 non-French).

It is probable that those figures have increased in the case of Chadians and also the French and other Europeans, who have come in greater numbers for petroleum and major construction. But the census shows that more realism in making estimates is called for.

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At the time of the census, the French consisted of 4,731 men and 4,313 women. Most of them are in the active bracket, especially those between the ages of 25 and 44 (cooperation workers, technical assistants, young executives, and so on). Most of the French live in the cities, especially Douala and Yaounde, but a significant number work in the rural areas (on agroindustrial projects). They are distributed as follows among the provinces: Littoral: 4,536; Centre-Sud: 2,985; Nord: 893; Ouest: 281; Est: 222; Sud-Ouest: 98; and Nord-Ouest: 29.

The Nigerians are mainly in Sud-Ouest Province (89,786), where they engage in trade and fishing. The Chadians are mainly in Nord Province (92.5 percent).

## Growth and Life Expectancy

Life expectancy is 43.2 years for men and 45.6 years for women. As far as marital conditions are concerned, there are 806,180 households with one wife and 249,548 men with two or more wives, but in fact the number of men with four or more wives is down to 23,780.

The crude birth rate is 4.5 percent, meaning that for an average population of 7 million inhabitants in 1975-1976 (the year preceding the census), there must have been 315,000 live births. But since the census reports only 249,465 children under 1 year old in April 1976 (about 65,000 less), it must be assumed (as census officials admit) that some of them were omitted and that others died. The reproduction rate for women between the ages of 20 and 24 is 23 percent, and it is lower for women below and above that age group. That percentage means that almost one woman out of four between the ages of 20 and 24 gives birth to a child. The mortality rate is estimated at 2.04 percent. As a result, the natural growth rate is 2.46 percent, or considerably more than the estimates for the first decade of independence (2.1 percent).

<u>Population of Large Cities</u>			
	<u>Population</u> <u>counted</u>	<u>Adjusted</u> <u>population</u>	<u>Adjustment</u> <u>factor</u>
Yaounde	291,071	313,705	1.077761
Douala	395,813	458,426	1.158188

## Education Level and Active Population

Still basing our figures on the raw data, we find that 31.8 percent of the inhabitants have been or are in primary schools, 3.7 percent are in secondary schools, and 0.29 percent are receiving a higher education.

Those percentages are obviously lower in the case of women than in the case of men: girls or women make up 16 percent of the students in higher education.

For the country as a whole, the employed active population probably totals 2,588,524 persons, of whom 21.6 percent are in the cities and 78.3 percent

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are in the rural areas. We learn from other figures that of that total, one-fifth, or 512,946, are unremunerated family workers, a large percentage of whom are in the rural areas, of course.

The working population is distributed among the various sectors as follows:

Primary sector (modern and traditional): about 2 million.  
 Secondary sector (including crafts): 173,000.  
 Tertiary sector: 150,000.  
 Government and domestic employment: 205,500.

While women account for nearly 50 percent of the work force in the primary sector, they are completely in the minority in the other sectors:

Secondary sector: 14.9 percent.  
 Tertiary sector: 18 percent.  
 Government and domestic employment: 12.9 percent.

On the other hand, they make up 28.4 percent of the 123,045 persons seeking work for the first time (here again, due to omissions of young men, that figure is undoubtedly underestimated, but not necessarily the percentage of women).

It would be well to reproduce here the breakdown by subgroup:

Secondary sector:	
Extractive industries	1,258
Manufacturing industries	122,411
Electricity, water, and gas	2,471
Construction and public works	46,779
Total	172,919

Tertiary sector:	
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels	108,042
Transportation, warehousing, and communications	36,259
Banking, insurance, real estate, business services	6,039
Total	150,340

In the cities, the employed active population is a minority in relation to the total population 6 years of age and older:

1. Employed active population	559,590
2. Unemployed active population (unemployed or seeking work for the first time)	78,024
3. Inactive population 6 years of age and older	901,932
including:	
Housewives	292,583
Students	524,883
Other	84,466
4. Unspecified	54,258

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Since the total urban population is 2 million, the employed active population represents almost 28 percent of that figure. The active employment figure of 559,590 is known to be practically double the number employed by the modern sector throughout the country (including both urban and rural areas). This means that many of the actively employed are working at poorly paid minor jobs in the cities. In this connection, it is noted that the number of students in the cities is almost as high as the number of actively employed, and this will certainly pose problems when it comes time to find jobs for all those students.

#### Living Conditions

The census gives an idea of housing in Cameroon.

The count included 1,390,896 dwelling units, of which nearly 200,000 have only one room housing an average of three persons each. In the 76,388 residences having 10 or more rooms, there is about one person per room. Of the dwellings, 9.4 percent have walls of concrete, concrete blocks, baked brick, or cut stone. Almost 56 percent are of earth or unbaked brick, and 14.6 percent have mud walls. Nearly half of those dwellings now have roofs of sheet metal or tile.

As far as lighting is concerned, 81,451 dwellings had electricity in April 1976 (76,096 of them in the cities), while 73 percent are still lighted by kerosene, and the others use oil, wood, or resin.

There is running water in 71,953 dwellings (including 36,229 in the cities) for the use of 428,574 persons (including 212,093 in the cities). The other inhabitants use fountains, wells, springs, rivers, or creeks.

Flush toilets exist in 30,062 dwellings (including 25,040 in the cities) for the use of 176,574 persons (including 150,403 in the cities), while 976,501 dwellings have latrines and 383,610 use other, unspecified facilities.

In view of the current craze for investing in stone, prospects are fine for the cement industry, plumbing, and electrical supplies, as well as for the trades using those materials.

The 1976 census shows progress over that for the years 1960-1965. It goes hand in hand with greater precision in the civil registry.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BOKASSA'S DEPARTURE NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3255-3256, 3257

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere]

[Excerpts] The turmoil caused by the Bangui affair has had the effect of lending public credence with more or less force to a version of the facts according to which the French Government, after raising Bokassa to power to assure its easy access to Central African mineral wealth, kept him in power at great expense, overlooking the excesses of his administration and finally deciding to overthrow him by armed intervention only after the country was completely ruined.

We will not try to determine at this point, in a still impassioned climate, the degree of fabrication in this account of the facts, but to provide accurate details concerning a certain number of ideas most often readily acknowledged as the basis for the real or supposed intervention of French authorities, i.e., the extent of Central African mineral wealth, the nature, intended purpose and value of the grants or loans which the Central African Government actually received from France and, finally, the economic situation, described as catastrophic, left behind by the former regime.

Researching the origins of Bokassa's fortune, in the political sense, poses a problem for historians. In truth, the advantage which France would have had in facilitating his rise to power is not apparent. Assuming that France could have and would have done so, it is even less apparent what would have prevented it from quickly correcting that mistaken judgment in view of the risks of a cooperative relationship marked on two occasions by violent disagreements. On the other hand, it would be difficult to entirely separate, among the many reasons for the overthrow of the former emperor, financial ruin from the dangers which it implied for the stability and security of that geographic region of Africa.

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#### Central African Mining Potential

For the Central African nation, uranium and diamonds represent natural wealth which undeniably occupies a special place in its economy. But to be precise, at the present time this is only potential wealth in the case of uranium.

If exploited, the Bakouma deposit located 480 kilometers east of Bangui would very likely provide an annual production of 1,500 tons of high-grade oxide contained in a highly phosphated ore, or nearly 50 percent of what Niger's uraniferous deposits currently produce.

Developing the deposit would first require extensive infrastructures, including a 250-kilometer main supply route between Bakouma and Bambari. But studies made by the Central African Uranium Company, one-third of whose capital is each held by the Central African Government, Alusuisse and the twosome COGEMA (General Nuclear Materials Company, an affiliate of the French Atomic Energy Commission)--CFMU (French Uranium Ores Company), have shown that the cost of the reagents and energy required would not make profitable exploitation possible at the current level of technology. Until processing methods are improved, Bakouma must therefore be considered a reserve whose existence is certainly favorable to the "rise" of the Central African nation on the international financial market, but one which does not yet generate revenue. It is only very natural for French companies, in partnership with others as they already are in Niger, to want to assure their option on this source of supply, whose size must be reduced to proper proportions. It is also unapparent that any government whatsoever could follow a different policy in this respect.

It is actually to diamonds, which represent 37.6 percent of the value of exports, that the domestic economy owes its positive trade balance, within a slightly negative balance of payments. The increase in prices largely offsets a slight drop in production from 1976 to 1978: 284,246 carats as opposed to 296,908 carats, with respective values of 8.5 billion CFA francs as opposed to 6.5 billion. The resumption in November 1978 of the operations of the Central African Company for Diamond Mining (SCED), suspended in 1976, should help to increase production, which peaked in 1968 with 609,382 carats. Here again, it is useful to compare these figures with those of other African countries such as Zaire (17 million carats), Ghana (2.25 million) or Angola (1.40 million), which respectively hold first, fifth and eighth place in world production, in order to appreciate the more modest ranking of the Central African Republic.

#### Agricultural and Industrial Situation

Having reestablished this relative scale, it would be wrong to conclude by an opposite approach that poor management was responsible for the failure of the economy, at the same time condemning the development programs implemented in the country for 20 years with bilateral and international aid, particularly French aid.

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The independence of such aid from the political situation really constitutes a golden rule, recently reiterated in Paris by Mr Claude Cheysson, and whose merits it would be very unfortunate to jeopardize in the public mind. Bokassa's economic management certainly did not favor development. However, its incoherence even prevented it from harming agricultural or industrial projects too seriously. It is difficult to express such projects in terms of tonnages, but they are generally based on a conscientious approach to solving human problems posed by production and they fortunately resisted the political vicissitudes better than drought. The bloodthirsty whims of an Idi Amin Dada and the resulting military operations thus affected Uganda's economic potential only superficially. Similarly in Chad, despite the civil war, farmers in the cotton zone started their operations as usual. Any drops in production, if they occur, will probably be due only to delays in delivery of fertilizers and insecticides.

Spreading the image that the Central African Republic is a drained country, at the risk of discouraging investors, would further undermine the efforts made to "save the furniture" by certain local officials whom it would be particularly unjust to include in the stinging censure of the former chief of state. The range of political and administrative officials in the Central African Republic is also so small that it would again be contrary to the country's interests to try to exclude any of them from public office for this sole reason.

Bearing the weight of geographic enclavement and a low population density, a reflection of the major endemic diseases of the past and of the disordered exploitation of former chartered companies, if the Central African Republic's economy is not at death's door, it is nevertheless still weak. The GDP [Gross Domestic Product] is one of the lowest in Africa. It rose nearly 33 percent from 1975 to 1979, however, because of the increase in diamond and coffee prices and the slow recovery of other agricultural produce. The low rate of population expansion affected the individual range of these results only slightly.

With almost assured self-sufficiency in food, we will note the ascending curve of coffee, which represents 30 percent of the value of exports and reached a record figure of 14,000 tons for the 1978-79 growing season. Good results were also recorded in 1978 for timber (16.5 percent of exports) with 400,000 cubic meters of rough timber and 86,000 cubic meters of sawed timber. Tobacco represents only 3 percent of exports, but from 1968 to 1977 its production increased steadily from 810 to 2,753 tons, falling off in 1978. Cotton on the other hand, particularly sensitive to good timing of cultural trends and planting, showed an unfortunate decline, with cottonseed tonnages dropping from 58,000 tons in 1969-70 to 38,000 tons in 1978-79 because of administrative insolvency and the abandonment of certain specific projects.

Industry has suffered from government intervention more than agriculture. Despite a 17-percent increase in the added value and an average increase of 27 percent in the sales of businesses between 1975 and 1978, it has really

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only slightly surpassed the 1969-70 level, a poor situation that is reflected rather well by river shipping statistics: a total of 106,000 tons imported in 1978 as opposed to 192,000 tons in 1970 and 142,000 tons exported compared with 80,000 tons. Electric power consumption itself has fluctuated at around 50 million kilowatt hours for 9 years.

With regard to foreign trade, the balance of trade, reflecting the doubling of diamond prices and the increase in coffee prices, showed a positive balance of 4.3 billion CFA francs in 1977, declining again to 3.4 billion in 1978 because of the stabilization of coffee prices and the drop recorded for cotton.\* After a surplus of 4.7 billion in 1976, the balance of payments showed deficits of 1.9 and 1.6 billion CFA francs in 1977 and 1978 due to the overall increase in the deficit of the balance of goods and services as well as to the reduction of the positive balance of nonmonetary capital and investments.

#### Foreign Aid, Financial Situation

These results as a whole, plus evidence of long-term foreign indebtedness kept within reasonable limits,\*\* show that if the best use was not always made of foreign aid, it nevertheless served to maintain the uncertain pomp of the court of Berengo.

For 1977 alone, this aid can be estimated at approximately 17.5 billion CFA francs, with 2.5 billion from international, European or inter-African organizations (EDF [European Development Fund], IBRD-IDA [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-International Development Association], UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa] and UNDP [UN Development Program]), 8 billion from bilateral aid (France, the United States, FRG and Libya) and 7 billion from bank loans, the largest of them (5 billion) having been granted at that time by South Africa in the form of supplier credits.

France supplied the most bilateral aid in this financial package, as is the case in most French-speaking African nations. From 1975 to 1978, FAC's [Aid and Cooperation Fund] investments and training and cooperation programs constituted an approximate annual financial volume of 1.3 billion CFA francs, which is relatively modest in comparison to that (2.6 billion) which the People's Republic of the Congo received during the same period despite its Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Totally assigned and subject for this purpose to the financial and technical supervision of the French Aid and Cooperation Mission, such support could

\* See article in MARCHES TROPICAUS ET MEDITERRANEENS of 2 November, page 2936: "Foreign Trade in Central Africa in 1978."

\*\* Approximately 18 billion CFA francs or one-fifth the GDP.

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not provide local officials with any opportunity to divert funds. This is also the case of programs concerning scientific research and technical personnel aid, the amount of which is not included in these figures, and which were implemented by direct payments from the French Government to the beneficiaries.

The problem is unfortunately not as simple in the case of aid which is sometimes called financial and sometimes budgetary in order not to use the name of "balance subsidy" which the Ministry of Cooperation wanted to eliminate from its vocabulary beginning in 1963. During the aforementioned period, its annual amount was approximately 2 billion CFA francs. It is true that most of it was also used to pay the salaries of Central African officials when their government proved to be incapable of doing so or to provide drugs for hospitals or, finally, to pay off debts of the Central African treasury to Air Afrique and especially to the French treasury, COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. The fact remains that this relief provided by French cooperation for operational administrative expenditures, normally the responsibility of the Central African Government, did facilitate the former emperor's senseless squandering of funds. If there is a lesson to be learned from the Bokassa affair, it is certainly that of the abuses which such a procedure risks causing almost inevitably.

However, the amounts are not the same. The expenses for the coronation alone were estimated at 7 billion CFA francs. Where did Bokassa's assets really come from? An examination of the budgets, generally showing a deficit since 1974,\* provides only a small amount of information in this regard. In fact, the anticipated revenue by no means corresponds to actual collections, as public and private corporations were in the habit of "negotiating" payment of their taxes in return for claims on them by the treasury. Restricting ourselves only to operations identifiable by accounting entries, the estimable real deficit for 1978 exceeded 7 billion CFA francs. But the government's resources were not all included in the national budget. In particular, they derived from stabilization funds whose large receipts, during the last years, particularly in the case of coffee because of the increase in prices, provided part of the "operating fund" of the former chief of state.

The fund was insufficient in any case, as evidenced by the phenomenal figure --with due allowance for domestic resources--of short-term foreign indebtedness and domestic indebtedness: 70 billion CFA francs, or the equivalent of 5 fiscal years. No Central African organization is currently able to handle the repayments which this involves.

\* The estimated 1978 budget deficit was 5 billion CFA francs.

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#### Financial Implications of Bokassa's Departure, Its Political Significance

The ideas of economic ruin and financial bankruptcy seem to have been confused in most commentaries published on the Bokassa phenomenon and analysis of his transition to power. The country's natural resources, agricultural as well as mineral, are fortunately still intact and their variety should open the way, with the few more orthodox methods of administration being established in Bangui, to a consolidation and development of its economy likely to encourage its creditors to be more understanding.

This should particularly be the case since the extent of the traditional sector, as elsewhere in Africa, is eliminating the burden of a financial disaster among other things and since the congenital dependence of a continental nation without energy resources on powers maintaining its exportable production and trade ultimately reduce the scope of this disaster to the scale of those powers instead of its remaining at its present level.

If the financial crisis in which the Central African nation finds itself mired today thus appears to have some solution, on the other hand it is not unrelated to the departure of the former emperor. With the gap between the scope of his private debts, which cannot be distinguished from public debts, and the more and more limited availability of credit which he could hope to find among his traditional allies, he was led to seek elsewhere the funds he needed by trying to negotiate the transfer or at least the "lease" of a base of political and military influence that would have been particularly dangerous due to the strategic position of the Central African nation.

In doing so, Bokassa replaced the greatest risks of contagion which many African nations feared concerning his removal--which explains why he enjoyed their benevolent neutrality for such a long time--with a much more serious danger of destabilization. Because by going along with Russian, Cuban and Libyan intervention in Africa, he would have jeopardized their security. This is why the African commission of inquiry set up in Kigali actually opened the way for the replacement of Bokassa by replying affirmatively to the questions concerning the Bangui massacres. It will also be noted that with the exception of Tripoli newspapers and PRAVDA, whose motivation is understandable, the way in which this was decided raised no official protest outside France.

Without wishing to exclude a priori the flaws in timing which may have characterized French policy in Africa during that period, it should definitely be noted that the Central African nation's considerable natural wealth, although limited in volume, played a less important role in Bokassa's overly long rule than a certain inter-African consensus of opinion. Similarly, it seems clear that it was by refusing to comply with his financial demands beyond normal limits of cooperation that France made his departure possible by breaking with that consensus of opinion.

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30

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT SEEKS BOKASSA PROPERTIES--The Central African Government has retained an attorney to obtain restitution of Bokassa's properties in France. No matter what the outcome of the legal battle between the former emperor and Bernard Tapie, Parisian businessman who purchased his chateaux (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 992), the Bangui authorities feel that these properties quite logically belong to the Central African state. And to no one else. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jan 80 p 43] 8143

PRIVATE SECTOR REGAINS SOME CONTROL--In Bangui on 7 January President Dacko met with representatives of the commercial chambers, the Federation of Employers and the Central African banks. On that occasion the chief of state announced his intention to: Return the commercial changers to the private sector; to turn over to planters the management of the Coffee Fund and Fund for Stabilizing and Equalizing Agricultural Products; to entrust to private firms the importing and sales of hydrocarbons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 404] 8094

STRICTER PRESS CONTROL--The Central African Government announced on 4 January that press cards would in the future be given only to professional newsmen recognized by the Ministry of Information. It seems that there is a move toward strict control over the entry of foreign newsmen into the CAR [Central African Republic], the government having denounced "tourists who instead of attracting international public opinion to the realities of Central Africa, are merely looking for disgusting scenes to supply items to the yellow press." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 204] 8094

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CHAD

FIGHTING BREAKS OUT IN OUADDAI

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 146

[Excerpt] Fighting broke out on 8 January near Am-Dam (Ouaddai region), a town located 100 km south of Abeche, between the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) of Hissene Habre and elements of the Front for Joint Action (FAC), which is made up of three factions: the People's Liberation Forces of Mahamat Abba Said; the Volcan Army of Adoum Dana; and the Revolutionary Democratic Council of Ahmat Acyl, all three reputed to be pro-Libyan.

The fighting probably did not end on 12 January with the taking of Am-Dam by the FAN, as was thought at first. According to the AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, there were at least 50 dead.

A conciliation mission headed by the military cabinet of President Goukouni Oueddei and made up of members of the two parties present and members of the FAP (People's Armed Forces) of Oueddei, whose zone of influence is neighboring on those of the FAN and the FAC, departed on 12 January for Abeche to "preach reconciliation."

In Ndjamena, where a certain amount of tension was being felt for a week because of the resumption of automatic weapon fire at night by uncontrolled elements, the leaders of the various factions at first refused to make any comment. According to observers, these leaders are seeking to "minimize" the incidents. Elsewhere, it was reported that a grenade had exploded during the night of 10-11 January against the door of the French ambassador's residence, a sign of the lack of security persisting in the capital.

The Chadian authorities are obviously disturbed by these events. It is not the first time, observers note, that such encounters have taken place; however, this time the fierceness and duration of the fighting does not permit description of these skirmishes between factions as "minor incidents" of the kind which at times take place in the zones of influence.

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32

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

AIRLINE OWNERSHIP--Thirty percent of the capital of Comorian Airlines belongs to the Comoran head of state, Ahmad Abdallah who had the shares transferred to him gratis. Financed by Kuwait, Comoran Airlines has set out to renew its entire fleet. [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Feb 80 p 54]

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CONGO

ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC PROGRAM REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TRCPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 90

[Text] In his end of the year message, President Sassou Nguesso has announced officially that Congo's biennial economic program of 1978-79 has not gone well and consequently a supplementary economic program will be put into effect.

The head of state, affirming that the weight of both domestic and foreign debt has become more crushing in 1979, noted that in spite of the battle against waste, state government and national industry finances have been tight for the whole year and the national industries have not really gotten well underway.

Stressing the necessity of improving this situation, the president stated that the supplementary program had the following objectives: starting up production again, restoration of state sectors and completion of some projects stopped in mid-course. He specified that the ensemble of economic sectors (rural economy, transportation, industry, energy and mines, construction and public works, commerce and tourism) will absorb around 93 percent of the total financing planned, calculated at more than 70 billion CFA francs.

"Realization of the supplementary program requires the vigilance of all workers to detect the unscrupulousness of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and their allies who are preparing to divert the money consecrated by the people for realization of the 1980 program," affirmed the head of state, who added that the sanctions which must strike the authors of such diversions of the public purse and other "acts of economic sabotage" will be strengthened. This increased repression will be accompanied by a reinforcement of preventive action.

President Sassou Nguesso also announced that an important conference of national industries with the fundamental common objective of "seeking ways and means to restore the productive arm of the state" will be held 10 January at Brazzaville.

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CONGO

## NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK'S CAPITAL INCREASED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 149

[Text] The extraordinary general assembly of the stockholders of the BNDC (National Development Bank of the Congo) was held in Brazzaville on 29 December and considered the following agenda:

--Modification of several regulations.

--Increase in the bank's capital from 1.087 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs to 1,246,310,000 billion CFA francs, consisting of a contribution of 159,310,000 CFA made up of 147,060,000 CFA francs from the Congolese state and 12,250,000 CFA francs from the Bank of Central African States (BEAC).

After this operation, the capital will be shared by the four stockholders in the following manner (the previous shares are shown in parentheses):

	Share (millions of CFA)	Percent	
Congolese state	1,000.5	80.28 (853.44	78.51%)
CCCE [Central fund for Economic Cooperation] (France)	115.5	9.27 (115.50	10.63%)
BEAC	102.81	8.25 ( 90.56	8.33%)
Depot and Storage Office (France)	27.5	2.20 ( 27.5	2.53%)
Total	1,246.31	100 (1.087	100 %)

This increase in capital should permit improvement of the bank's financial situation and relief from the rediscount date set for the financing of real estate, craft industries and commercial credits.

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In 1979, the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) ceased providing the technical assistance it had been giving the bank for several years.

The prospects for BNDC activity in 1980 are as follows:

--Resumption of the real estate credit within the limits of the rediscount due date at the Central Bank, in the absence of any new resources made available for this kind of operation. Reportedly the credits will be granted to finance completion of the construction projects underway, various installations (water and sanitary) or the purchase of construction materials.

--Financing of small and medium-size industrial companies from funds obtained in 1978 from the African Development Bank (ADB); i.e., 1 billion CFA. The mobilization of these funds, however, is contingent upon the installation in the bank of two technical assistants responsible for study and execution of the projects to be financed.

--Resumption of credit to the small equipment sector within the framework of a Congolese Finance Company (SOFICO). The bank reportedly will be a stockholder in this new company and will lend it some of its personnel.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

MARCHAIS VISIT DIVIDES PCT--The Politburo of the Congolese Labor Party [PCT] reportedly did not unanimously approve the upcoming visit to Brazzaville of Georges Marchais, secretary-general of the French Communist Party. Although they are sympathizers with Moscow foreign policy, some Congolese leaders are said to fear that this internationalist "solidarity" will be detrimental to the relations with France which were consolidated by the visit to Paris of the chief of state, Col Sassou Nguesso, in October 1979. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Jan 80 p 43] 8143

PCT MEMBERSHIP--On the occasion of celebration of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Congolese Labor Party by Marien N'Gouabi, which was held in Brazzaville on 31 December, it was stated in the Congolese capital that the party has 6,961 members (6,558 men and 403 women). It is broken down into committees (109), cells (347) and nucleuses (307). This is essentially a party of "farmers and workers" (69 percent of the members). The Brazzaville district has the greatest number of members (1,879), compared to the Kouilou region (1,300), the economic center of the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 148] 8143

1980 BUDGET DATA--In our 23 December 1979 edition, p 3685, we announced the approval of the 1980 budget by the National Popular Assembly in Brazzaville. This budget is drawn up on the basis of revenues and expenditures totaling 86.02 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs: operating budget, 69.6 billion; investment budget, 16.42 billion. The budget reflects a 25.5 percent increase over that of the preceding fiscal year, which was 68.54 billion CFA. Unlike the budgets of previous fiscal years, this budget should be balanced, as the result of increased oil revenues from the placing in operation of the Likouala deposit and rises in oil prices. Personnel costs (not including personnel charges included under "transfers") are still sizable and represent a little over half (51.2 percent) of the ordinary operating expenses. The investment budget has more than doubled (7.75 billion CFA in 1979). Revenues of the investment budget are derived from equipment bonds of the National Solidarity Fund and loans on oil products (11.5 billion CFA). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 148] 8143

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SHIPYARD EXPANSION--In Brazzaville on 2 January the minutes of the talks between the Congo and China on expanding the Chacona shipyard in the Congolese capital were signed. The document signed by the ambassador of China to the Congo and the Congolese minister of transport, H. Mounthault, provides for fitting out the workshops and the shipyard's present installations with a view to building low tonnage ships with metal hulls. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 206] 8094

DETAILS ON 'IDA' PETROLEUM LOAN--In our 11 January 1980 issue, p 90, we announced the granting of credits to the Congo by IDA [International Development Association]. Let us note today that these \$5 million in credits, reimbursable in 50 years, 10 years of which are deferred with an annual commission of 0.75 percent, should make it possible to finance the services of several experts (geologists, financiers and petroleum engineers) and training programs for the benefit of the Hydro-Congo firm. Two surveys are also included in this financing: An aeromagnetometric survey of the Congolese basin to gather data on the extent of petroleum deposits in this area; a study of the technical data and programs of ELF-Congo so as to step up the recovery of petroleum from the "Emerald" deposit. The project will be undertaken by the Congolese Ministry of Mines and Energy. The Congo's share in the financing of this project is to be in the amount of \$600,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 206] 8094

NEW HYDRO-CONGO DIRECTOR--On 10 January the Congolese Government set about appointing a new director general of Hydro-Congo (a state firm for commercializing hydrocarbons) in the person of Camille Okamba, a party member, hitherto commercial director of this firm. Okamba replaces Mboudo Nes who has been assigned to other duties. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 206] 8094

DETAILS ON PRC CONSTRUCTED DAM--The details of the dam built at Moukouloukoulou on the Bouenza thanks to Chinese aid (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 11 Jan 1980 p 90) are as follows: Made entirely of reinforced concrete, it supplies a hydroelectric power plant with a 74,000 KW capacity (four generators). The work began in 1974 and the first turbine was put into service in 1978. A 230 kilometer long network with 110 KW and 35 KW should make it possible to provide the area's centers with electricity (Loutete, Loudima, Loubomo, Nkayi). Extending it to Brazzaville is under study. Assumption of the management of these installations by the Congo's SNE [National Energy Company] is expected this year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 206] 8094

PRC CONSTRUCTED DAM--President Sassou Nguesso inaugurated at the end of December the hydroelectric dam of Moukoulou. The fruit of Sino-Congolese cooperation, the 74,000 kW facility is located in the south in the Bouenza region. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 90] 8860

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

ABD LOAN--The African Development Bank (ADB) on 9 January granted a loan of 500,000 units of account (125 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs) to Equatorial Guinea to permit it to finance studies relating to the modernization of the Bata airport, which is located in the continental part of the country, formerly Rio Muni. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147] 8143

PRC RELATIONS--Ji Pengfei, Chinese vice premier, met on 6 January in Peking with Eulogio Oyo Riquesa, member of the Superior Military Committee of Equatorial Guinea and governor of Bioko province. The two men discussed the development of commercial relations, economic aid and cooperation in the health sector between Malabo and Peking. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147] 8143

PRC STRENGTHENS DIPLOMATIC POSITION--The PRC is completing the construction of the telephone exchange in Malabo, capital of Equatorial Guinea, which will contribute to a heavy flow of communication between the island and the continent. In the meanwhile the Soviets are abandoning the base in Luba and are withdrawing definitively from the country. The Chinese seem to have strengthened their diplomatic position with the new Guinean regime. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Feb 80 p 5]

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GABON

BONGO REGIME UNDER FIRE FOR CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

French Participation

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 204, 7 Jan 80 pp 10-12

[Article by Elie Ramaro]

[Text] Cherished nostalgia, changing with the wind: today in the Gabonese capital of Libreville [Freeville]--but how poorly that name fits!--an atmosphere of deja vu prevails. Within a few weeks, President Albert Bongo has managed to place two of his most loyal French friends in strategic positions: Maurice Delauney, ambassador from 1965 to 1972 and then from 1975 to the end of 1979, is now president of the Franceville Uranium Mining Company (COMUF) and Capt Maurice Robert, an agent of the French Foreign Intelligence and Counterespionage Service (SDECE) and then an official of the security services of Elf-Aquitaine (which controls Elf-Gabon among others), has just been appointed French ambassador to Libreville.

Besides having been appointed by Paris at the amicable request of the Gabonese president, these two men have a common feature: they were close associates of Jacques Foccart, the notorious chief of Gaullist secret agents in Africa and who also held the post of general secretary to the president of the French Republic for African and Malagasy Affairs from 1960 to 1974. According to certain diplomatic circles in Paris, the civilian recycling of these retired employees of French intelligence services is intended to reassure Omar Bongo: the Gabonese chief of state today seems to fear for the very survival of his regime, particularly since the elimination by Paris itself of the emperor Bokassa, who had become more troublesome than useful for the force of guardianship.

The Paris Connection

Aware that he has played with fire a great deal by making it easy for shady characters such as the mercenaries Gilbert Bourgeaud (alias Bob Denard) and

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Assomption, former chief of his presidential guard, to congregate in Gabon and by permitting his country to serve as a rear base for destabilization operations covering the entire African continent, Omar Bongo wants to surround himself with more reliable individuals who have a good knowledge of security problems and experience in clandestine work.

But the Gabonese president's government will have trouble forgetting its responsibility in a series of major incidents which have bloodied Africa for about 15 years and depicted Gabon as a simple country linked to French imperialism in Western and central Africa. We need only recall the secessions of Katanga and Biafra in the sixties, in which French agents working from Libreville were directly involved. Or the "Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda enclave" (FLEC), in which Elf-Gabon and the French mercenary Jean Kay became well known.

Despite Gabon's denials, that country's responsibility was also demonstrated--and how!--in the case of the landing of mercenaries in Cotonou in April 1977: the operation was staged by "Colonel" Bourgeaud with the direct support of Morocco (whose eagerness is well known for flying to the aid of the "Western order" anywhere that it appears threatened in Africa) and the complicity of France, whose secret services had used the talents of Bourgeaud-Denard on several occasions for recruiting mercenaries. The same Bob Denard--who had been "loaned" for a few months in 1975 by Omar Bongo to the Comorian Government at that time to help it to assure control of Anjouan Island--managed to carry out a landing by sea at Moroni in the Comoro Islands in May 1978: the operation led to the overthrow of Ali Soilih's progressive government and to the restoration of Ahmed Abdallah's feudal regime, while simultaneously giving a French mercenary the opportunity--unique in contemporary African history--to rule this small archipelago in the Indian Ocean for 5 months.

But this regrouping around the Gabonese chief of state of some of the best agents of the "shady kingdom," formerly ruled by Jacques Foccart, is not necessarily an all-risk insurance policy for Omar Bongo's regime. Maurice Delauney will certainly have been the "ambassador from Gabon" as much as from Paris, as Omar Bongo said on the day of his false retirement. And among other things, he benevolently concealed or even aided most of the operations organized from Gabonese territory while he occupied the French House. Of course, since 1964 Maurice Robert has been--following the coup d'etat against former President M'Ba, who was saved at that time only by the intervention of the French army in Libreville!--a respected adviser of Gabonese leaders in security matters: the SDECE officer made frequent appearances in Libreville, not even bothering to conceal his activities.

However, both bore the expenses--like a large part of the Foccart networks--of an in-depth reorganization of French secret services since President Giscard d'Estaing has come to power. They are the survivors of a time when De Gaulle--burned by the Algerian affair, the revolt of military leaders, seditious attempts and the clandestine action of the OAS [Secret Army

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Organization]--had to manage without the help of the army to implement his African policy and to assure the security of established moderate governments in favor of the 1960 independences. Foccart, an import-export specialist in the French colonies and well received in Gaullist circles, had put his African network in the general's service, in touch with the Gaullist branch of the SDECE. Most of the 15 African neocolonies of France had an effective "umbrella" at that time in the sixties: direct relations with Foccart, a kind of "African" superminister of the Elysee surpassing other French leaders and French advisers for security and political affairs on presidential staffs . . . In short, there was a kind of secret coordination of the entire so-called "cooperation" policy, which has always represented a reserved area of the Elysee in France, as a series of recent events have again shown.

## Custom and Style

Some conditions have now changed. The "reserved area" remains: after a transition period, a Secretariat for African Affairs was reestablished in the Elysee and assigned to Rene Journiac, former assistant to Jacques Foccart. But its role is more political and less economic or military than in the past. President Giscard d'Estaing has made peace with his army: their staffs, purged several times, can no longer be considered Giscardian and the president is again primarily relying on the services of the army for the needs of his policy of presence in Mauritania, Chad, Zaire, the Central African Republic, etc.

What is more, a veritable "African army" is currently in the process of being recreated, with priority in the case of investment credits being given to what the French call "foreign intervention forces": recruitment of professionals and specialists in overseas combat to make the 11th parachute division and 9th marine infantry division more operational; establishment of a special long-distance signal communications unit; training of an armored unit which can be moved to a remote theater of operations; modernization of routing resources and air and sea support; establishment of small special assignment units (commandos, espionage, etc.). This revival of interest in military operations in Africa is accompanied by an increase in the number of technical assistance military advisers (currently 1,500) and African trainees in French military schools (2,500 in 1979).

Paralleling this, the espionage and counterespionage service (SDECE), assigned to the army since 1970 following gross "blunders" (Ben Barka affair, drug trafficking), has constantly been purged of its Gaullist elements for 10 years: its chief, Alexandre de Marenches, has tried to bring the SDECE close to its American and British counterparts and has given preference to the "anticommunist and antisubversive struggle" aspect, particularly in African countries, whereas former Gaullist agents spent part of their time outwitting their Western competitors.

There have been two main stages in this reorientation: the transfer of Col Jannou Lacaze, who received his stars and was then made head of the

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11th parachute division; and the more recent appointment of Gen Rene Candelier, former assistant director of military security--the French army's internal secret service.

The men placed by Omar Bongo in key positions among his associates are thus also those who were ousted during the purges which were carried out over 5 years in circles of "African secret agents" of France. The French daily LE MONDE recalled on 19 December that Maurice Robert, just promoted to ambassador, had not been received by the general director of the SDECE, as is customary in such cases. Custom says a lot about the somewhat special style of French-African relations. But its nonobservance says even more about the reputation enjoyed, at French intelligence "headquarters," by a man who was its collaborator for more than 20 years. Unless Omar Bongo is in turn bearing the cost for this redeployment of the French "foreign program"!

#### Alleged Macchiavellian Policies

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 204, 7 Jan 80 pp 12, 13

[Article by San Fiel]

[Excerpt] A general climate of insecurity, assassinations and attempted assassinations, arbitrary arrests, torture and police harassment are increasing in Gabon while an African press paid by President Bongo continually publishes extra and special editions to praise his government, his "impressive personality," his "concern for political resurgence" and his "fight against corruption." The coffers of the chief of state actually pay millions of francs to African and non-African newspapers and reporters ready to praise the "great Gabonese statesman."

And yet the reality is well known by everyone, from the businessman who invests in Gabon to the poor unemployed Gabonese citizen, from the accredited diplomat in Libreville to shady politicians surrounding Leon M'Ba's successor.

Libreville is obsessed with assassinations nowadays. Some died during so-called armed burglaries, like that of the Gabonese customs officer mentioned in LE MONDE of 9 May. Others are killed when scores are settled, like that of the president of the Gabonese Association of French Citizens, while in political and diplomatic circles of the Gabonese capital the most macabre stories circulate about the physical elimination of all those from whom disclosures are feared concerning the corruption of leaders or murders committed by their secret agents, henchmen or mercenaries.

#### A Commando Unit

The case of Atty Agondjo Okawe Pierre Louis, president of the national Gabonese bar and dean of the Libreville Faculty of Law, is well known today.

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What do Gabonese officials have against the president of the Libreville national bar? Quite simply the fact that he has refused and still refuses to endorse the corrupt administration headed by Bongo. He refuses to give his endorsement because he knows, like his friends and supporters, that his entry into the government would give it a kind of respectability and would inspire a trust which it totally lacks in the eyes of public opinion and African opinion in general.

That is why he immediately became the target of the government's secret agents. As early as the summer of 1972, he received a letter threatening him with death. He was then arrested and jailed with other professors and students under the false pretext of being part of a "communist plot" against the government; the inhuman treatment inflicted on them during their detention and the physical and moral torture which they suffered lasted more than 4 years. Freed in 1976, Atty Agondjo Okawe has constantly been under stronger and stronger pressure from Bongo to agree to participate in the government. A government ridden with corruption and indebtedness, as also confirmed by LE MONDE of 13 February, after an "orgy of investments . . . " A government that stays in power thanks to French paratroops and the Moroccan presidential guard. A country whose territory is a favorite haunt for all sorts of plots against Benin and Angola (and the current location of Roberto Holden, leader of the puppet movement of the FNLA after being expelled from Dakar and Abidjan, FLEC's henchmen, etc.).

But the case of the dean of the Libreville Faculty of Law is far from being an isolated instance. For example, it recalls that of the former Gabonese representative to OCAM, Mba Germain, then ambassador to Bonn. Suspected of plotting against Bongo, Mba was assassinated in Libreville in 1971 and his body disappeared. There was the case of Ndouna Depenaud, former ambassador to Israel and Equatorial Guinea, slain in Libreville in 1977. There was the case of Gwono Nguema, minister of scientific research, who was gunned down in 1978 by machinegun fire, and that of the great impetus of the sole party, Chambrier-Rehandji, who escaped an assassination attempt in his country in 1978.

But the list of "missing persons" is long: sometimes it is a car accident, sometimes a helicopter or plane crash. Such as the "accidental" death of the former Gabonese roving ambassador, Pierre Fanguinover, which occurred in France, or the "disappearance" of the helicopter transporting the chief of staff of the Gabonese air force, Djoue, 2 years ago. Or the case of Joseph Avaro-Abouroue, professor of history and former dean of the Libreville Faculty of Literature and Humanities, who was the victim of an "accident" while he was at the controls of the plane which he had rented from the air club in the capital.

Regardless of the reason, the least criticism made of the reign of terror and assassination imposed by Bongo is enough to warrant arbitrary arrests and an accusation of "communist" or "Cuban agent." Thus hundreds of Gabonese patriots, including several officials, professors, students and

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trade unionists are rotting in Bongo's jails. Is it necessary to recall the case of Mr Diata, that former student of Saint-Cyr, or of Mr Irigo, a former Naval School student, whose physical conditions have constantly deteriorated since they were thrown into prison in 1978? Or the situation of Beninese and Equatorial Guineans, whose expulsions continue despite the strong protests of their governments?

European and African mercenaries, Moroccan secret agents, professional killers, torture chambers (particularly in the Akebe district in Libreville), the general headquarters of many counter-revolutionary and fascist organizations, Gabon can today take advantage of having become the haven of paid assassins who find refuge there and the base of operations against all progressive African and Arab patriots and governments.

#### Bongo's Alleged Fortune

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 204, 7 Jan 80 p 14

[Text] Ten villas in Libreville, Port-Gentil and Franceville, apartments and property in France, Switzerland and the United States (Los Angeles), millions of dollars in secret Swiss accounts, this is only part of Bongo's fortune. It is certainly not all.

Here are the names of some Gabonese companies whose stock is totally or mainly controlled by Bongo and his family: Soaco, Sciages industriels de la Lowe, Savonnerie du Gabon, Chimi-Gabon, Grands Garages gabonais, Sogemat, Somatem, Sogo, Sogadi, Sogasig, Sogadiex, Socoba, EDTP, Soder, Sodegab, Sotraho, UDEC, Sariha, Union gabonaise de travaux, Gabon-Engeneering, Sogec, Seteg, Soganet, ADG, Air-Service, Air-Inter Gabon, Somargo, Somicoa, Banque du Gabon et du Luxembourg, Sogafonex, Assurances generales, Omnium, Societe de Services.

This list would have to be supplemented by the improved and unimproved property, hotels, movie houses, restaurants and shops controlled by his wife Josephine or his brother-in-law, Jean-Boniface Asselle, director of the National Bureau of Investigation and minister of education.

It is difficult to estimate the fortune of Bongo and his family. It seems that he himself, like his Zairian counterpart Mobutu, is unable to calculate it. The most modest figures obtained by French secret services are on the order of 400 billion CFA francs or F8 billion, while actual investments exceed F15 billion.

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GABON

RULES, REGULATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147

[Text] Members of the Gabonese Government and the PDG [Gabonese Democratic Party] who met 7 January at Libreville, have decided that the anticipated legislative elections will be held next February in two sessions. The elections will be organized to comply with the new electoral law voted last December by the National Assembly.

The first election session will be held 3 February, a preliminary selection will be made among the candidates by the section bureaus and PDG committees of each district.

The direct popular vote will be organized for 17 February and will be on the blocked out provincial list.

It should be recalled that for the last legislative elections organized in 1973, the voters selected from a single list of candidates chosen by party caucus of the single party. The new methods of electing assembly members, who will serve 5 years (and not for 7 years) will thus lead to the population having a greater voice in the choice of representatives. However, it is still not the multiparty system abolished in 1968 by President Bongo.

Finally, let us note that the new electoral law, specifying that the candidates must be of Gabonese nationality and belong to the PDG, excludes persons exercising the following functions: general comptroller for the state; general inspectors and finance inspectors; administrative affairs inspectors; general and central administrative managers; district and territorial administrative heads; judiciary or administrative magistrates; general paymaster for the treasury; presidents, directors, general managers of banking or state credit agencies, or of national public enterprises; general directors or officers of autonomous public services; military officers; penitentiary officials above the rank of officer; chief inspectors of ports and customs.

On the other hand, the mandate of deputy is incompatible with service as member of the Supreme Court and the Economic and Social Council or any non-elective public position, excepting certain exceptions authorized by decree.

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The entry of a deputy to government service implies the loss of his mandate to the benefit of a surrogate.

And finally (articles 28 and 29 of the electoral law) parliamentarians are enjoined from letting their names and titles appear in any financial, commercial or industrial publicity. There will also be "imprisonment for 1 to 6 months and/or fine of 10,000 to 500,000 CFA francs for any founder, director or manager of any business, or commercial, industrial or financial establishment who uses the name and title of any parliamentarian in any publicity for the benefit of that enterprise and not observing the injunction to cease this practice in 15 days."

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

CCCE AGRICULTURAL LOAN--On 20 December 1979 the Central Economic Cooperation fund granted an 8.4 million French franc loan to the Republic of Guinea Bissau to help in financing personnel training and technical support for getting underway the agro-industrial center at Cumere. The FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] has also furnished a 2.1 million French franc grant for the same center. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 136] 8860

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KENYA

PROBLEMS IN WILD ANIMAL PROTECTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 92

[Text] Looking over the wildlife situation in Kenya, AFP stressed that this is still the essential tourist attraction of the country. But this fauna, very abundant and extremely diverse, preserved in 20 parks and preserves, is particularly threatened by poaching, pollution, deforestation and agricultural encroachment which is damaging some species.

Poaching has particularly increased since hunting was banned in May 1977 and the sale of trophies prohibited in March of the following year. The authorities have sounded the alarm and decided to strengthen controls.

Kenya now counts only 65,000 elephants as compared to 167,000 in 1973 and 1500 black rhinoceros as compared to 20,000 10 years ago. Conscious of the particular threat to these last, now on the way to complete disappearance, President Arap Moi last May decreed special measures for their protection.

But the lure of rhinoceros horn and its reputed aphrodisiacal virtues is such that the efficacy of these measures seems doubtful. As for the elephant, it seems to have resisted the hecatomb better, nevertheless, poachers are a serious menace and attack younger and younger animals. Twice as many beasts must be killed to provide the same weight in ivory of 25 years ago.

On the other hand, if the units to fight poaching are better trained and better equipped, the poachers themselves are also better armed and sometimes seem to benefit from some high placed protection as certain recent facts seem to attest. Also, to really fight effectively against poaching and the illicit trade in trophies, a team of international experts has suggested the creation of a central and eastern Africa regional organization. In effect, Kenya is often only a turntable for trophies smuggled in from neighboring countries via Lake Victoria. Another weapon would be ratification by all the countries and application of a convention governing international commerce in endangered species.

But poaching is not the only scourge menacing Kenyan wildlife. As was said above, pollution, deforestation and agricultural encroachment are other dangers that have not escaped the attention of the authorities.

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49

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LIBERIA

PROBATE COURT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZES PPP

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 144

[Excerpt] The administrative court of Liberia--the Probate Court--on 8 January confirmed its decision rendered on 24 December 1979 in favor of recognition of the Progressive People's Party (PPP); the sole objection filed by a private party was removed, eliminating all possibility of appeal.

The court's decision marks a very important watershed in the country's political history by ending 25 years of the single-party system and particularly by recognizing for the first time the appearance of a socialist party which in fact had never existed since the founding of the republic in 1847.

The new party was established by that famous Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), founded in 1975 in the United States, which did not reach Liberia until 1978, where its membership grew very quickly principally among the intelligensia but also among the young, some cadres and the mass of the unemployed. It was its demonstration held in April 1979 against a government plan to increase the price of rice, the base foodstuff of the Liberians, which really made it known, because of the murderous fights it provoked (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, dated 20 April 1979, p 1007). At that time, the country was in great danger, and these "events" have in recent months maintained a climate of great tension among the people and considerable concern in the government (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, dated 14 and 28 December 1979, pp 3464 and 3679).

Gabrie Bacchut Matthews, president of the PAL and PPP, recently brought up the subject of the struggle for influence experienced on that occasion by the government and the leaders of the sole party up to then, the True Whig Party (TWP); and he thanked the chief of state, William Tolbert, for "having tried to do everything he could to respect the rights of citizens." He did not conceal the fact that had the chief of state failed to do so Liberia would have risked sinking into civil war.

The government, like the TWP, in a way have been forced to recognize the PPP, all the more so because unless it changed it and made itself more

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unpopular, it could not place itself in opposition to the Constitution which, in fact, provides for the possibility of several parties.

Although the objectives of the PPP are identical to those of the PAL, Matthews said, its specific program, however, still remains to be defined. In any event, it is possible that the PAL which until recently claimed 20,000 members and over 100,000 "student, worker and farmer" sympathizers will have to disappear and merge totally with the new party.

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MALI

ECONOMIC WOES COMPOUNDED FOLLOWING STUDENT UNREST

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 996, 6 Feb 80 p 43

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "High Officials To Walk"]

[Text] At the end of January, the government had to disburse 1.4 billion Malian francs (700 million francs CFA) all at once in order to pay for all the grants awarded to university and high school students. To the 250 million francs CFA (at least) going to the youth in the country--which had not been paid since October--had to be added the 450 million for the January allocations and the bi-annual payments which should, in principle, be paid in advance to students abroad.

Coming on the heels of the student strikes and demonstrations of December 1979, this measure has been well received by the students. The demands which had caused the closing of university and school institutions from 16 November to 14 January have apparently been satisfied. However, the climate within the administration is not very optimistic. There was despair, the bottom of the till was ransacked. In the even that the promise made to students is fulfilled by gathering all the crumbs, another obligation will apparently not fare too well in the near future: the payment of civil service salaries, the monthly total of which amounts to some 2 billion francs CFA.

This means that problems have only been shifted around. On this particular point at least, the students will lower the tone of their demands, while those of the parents may become more strident according to the rumors being bandied about. This is all the more true since it is certain, by now, that France will not grant Mali this year the annual budgetary assistance which had, in the past, contributed toward the payment of civil service salaries.

Mali has not yet breathed its last gasp, and civil servants will be paid without difficulty for the next few months. However, the threat will become increasingly heavier as the budget will suffer more and more cuts. Tempers in Bamako may well rise again. This is why, no doubt, the talk is increasingly about draconian austerity measures. The first such measure has already been adopted. As of 1 February, high government officials will no longer enjoy the use of service cars.

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Savings will no doubt be significant, but it remains to be seen whether it will be productive in the long run. In Bamako, taxis are rare, public transportation is nonexistent, distances are long and the heat is much too oppressive to make walking attractive. Moreover, the buying power of officials (be they "high" or not) is too restricted to allow them the purchase of personal vehicles.

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MAURITIUS

BRIEFS

EMERGENCY AID--On 30 January, the European Commission, by speeding up procedures, decided to send [Mauritius] immediate financial assistance of 300,000 UCE to cover its most urgent needs [following successive cyclones]. The decision does not exclude the possibility of additional future assistance. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 333]

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MOZAMBIQUE

CONSTRUCTION OF POWERPLANT IN QUELIMANE ALMOST COMPLETED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN in French 18 Jan 80 p 156

[Text] Mr Antonio Rocha, director of construction for Mozambique Electricity, announced in the daily newspaper NOTICIAS DA BEIRA that assembly of the electrical and mechanical equipment for the new electricity station at Quelimane situated midway between the two and the new airport will begin around the end of January or beginning of February.

A 25-ton crane for handling the heaviest generator pieces was put into place at the end of last year. Once installed, the new Quelimane station will have a 6,800 kW power capacity; there will be two generators of 3,400 kW each.

Each generator includes an alternator operating on fuel-oil, a fuel much more economical than the diesel usually used. Fuel-oil can only be used for high-power diesel motors such as those to be installed in the station for Zambesia's capital. The price of fuel-oil is a third of diesel, leading to substantial foreign exchange savings.

The energy produced by the new station will be carried by high tension cables to the former central station, now a sub-station, from which distribution to Quelimane will be made.

The new groups must have more power available than currently consumed in order to serve new users on the periphery of the town. A 30,000-volt line will be set up to Nicoadala which will furnish power to various industrial enterprises, especially SOCOCO, a ceramics works, and the town of Nicoadala itself.

The generators to be installed at Quelimane are made by a British firm, Mirrlees Blackstone, who have already supplied similar equipment at other Mozambique stations: Lichiga, Chokue, and Xai-Xai. Sent by sea from Great Britain, they were unloaded at Beira and transported by lighter to Quelimane. British technicians will arrive in early February to provide the technical assistance necessary for the assembly of the material. They will be assisted by technicians from the state agency Mozambique Electricity.

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55

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH--Prospecting in Nampula Province is now underway to inventory both qualitatively and quantitatively the geological resources of this region (graphite, clay, pegmatites). Graphite studies are being conducted at the deposits of Otaco, Ancane, Itatone and Ivate. Studies on clay are being done in coordination with the National Agency for Industry and Construction. Studies on pegmatite (colombo-tantalite, beryl, precious and semiprecious stones, mica, quartz) are being conducted by the National Agency for Geology, Mines and Conservation of Earth Resources in the districts of Ribaua, Mecubiri, Muecate, Monapo and Nacala. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 156] 8860

CEMENT PRODUCTION--The three factories belonging to the Cimentos de Mozambique company have a combined production of 1 million tons of cement: 600,000 tons from the Matola unit, 300,000 tons for the Nova-Maceira-Dondo one and 100,000 tons for the unit in Nacala. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 336]

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NIGER

CCCE GRANTS FIVE LOANS TO NIGER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 138

[Text] The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation [CCCE] on 20 December 1979 granted five loans totaling over 283 billion French francs (14.15 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs) to the Republic of Niger as aid to finance several projects:

Coal: a loan of 45.5 million French francs (2.275 billion CFA) will complement the loan of 70 million francs (3.5 billion CFA) already granted in 1977 to open a coal mine in Anou-Arare and install a thermal powerplant which will provide electricity to the city of Agades and its Arlit uranium exploitations. The overall cost of the first tranche will be about 800 million francs (40 billion CFA).

Uranium: a loan of 140 million French francs (7 billion CFA) will permit Niger to finance its share in the Tassa N'Taghalgue Mining Company (SMTT), which was recently established (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS dated 5 October, p 2705) and which has responsibility for exploitation of a third uranium deposit in Niger. The production of processed uranium could total 1,500 tons per year.

There are also plans to install a sulfuric acid manufacturing plant with a 70,000 tons per year capacity. The cost of the project is estimated at 2.6 billion French francs (130 billion CFA).

Telecommunications, television: two loans totaling 95 million French francs (4.75 billion CFA) will be used for the partial financing of a telecommunications and television development project. Niamey will be hooked up with the international network via satellite and with the principal mining and urban centers in the interior by Hertzian networks. Four new television transmitters will be installed in Agades, Arlit, Ingall and Bilma.

The project cost will be about 290 million French francs (14.5 billion CFA). Complementary funding will be obtained from a grant of 42 million francs (2.1 billion CFA) from the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], buyer's credits and a share of the Niger budget.

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Water works: a loan of 2.67 million French francs (133.5 billion CFA) will permit the financing of a study on the underground waters of the Tarka Valley, near the Nigerian border. The study will be conducted by two French organizations, SATEC [Technical Aid and Cooperation Company] and BRGM (Geological and Mining Prospecting Office).

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NIGER

BRIEFS

BELGIAN PROJECT COMPROMISED--The Belgian linguistic quarrel between the Flemish and the Walloons could deprive Belgium of an agricultural project worth 1.5 billion Belgian francs (200 million French francs) in Niger, the AFP reports. In 1978, French-speaking Lucien Outers, at the time minister of cooperation, had given his approval to the project and decided to have it executed by a Walloon company, SOCOL [expansion unknown]-Boismans. However, in April 1979, Flemish Mark Eyskens, the new head of the Ministry of Cooperation, delayed signing the project, thus hoping to give it to a Flemish company, Coenjarts, which does not meet the specifications. A budget ministerial committee is now trying to get the in extremist project started again. However, Belgian economic authorities fear that this affair threatens to make Belgium lose all credibility vis-a-vis the Niger authorities and furthermore compromise the efforts exerted by Belgium to assure its uranium supplies from Niger. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 138] 8143

ADB LOAN--The African Development Bank (ADB) on 11 January granted a loan of 4.35 million units of account (1.175 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs) to Niger to permit financing of a project designed to supply electricity to the uranium mines of Niger, from a thermal powerplant operating on coal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 139] 8143

RICE CULTIVATION GRANT--The European Development Fund [EDF] is going to aid in the development of rice cultivation on the Niger River (hydroagricultural development in the Koutoukale basin). The new EDF grant will be 5.5 million ECU [European currency unit] (about 1.595 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs). [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 139] 8143

NEW TAXES--On 27 December Niger's Council of Ministers approved a draft statute authorizing districts, towns and communes to institute special taxes for the purpose of financing projects to expand their water and electric distribution networks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 198] 8094

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NIGERIA

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES REVIEWED BY ENVOY TO BELGIUM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 85

[Text] On 29 November 1979 Nigerian Ambassador to Brussels S. E. M. Afobali submitted to the African Royal Circle a rather interesting report on the economic objectives of his country and on its relations with Belgium.

Having stated in his preamble that, with its 80 million population Nigeria had the right to state that its citizens account for "one out of four black Africans in the world" and that, surrounded by French speaking countries, it had "no language barrier," the ambassador described the federation in its new political context and emphasized that the economic targets of his government were not different from those included in the development plans successively formulated by the military regimes. He merely pointed out that president Shagari had decided particularly to emphasize agriculture. Therefore, he stated, the government "has involved itself in huge agricultural programs" whose purpose is not only to reverse the situation but to result in a real "agrarian revolution." He cited numerous passages of the president's statement in this respect. He recalled that a Bank for Agriculture had been established especially for the purpose of helping agricultural investors and that directives had been issued to all commercial banks to offer advantageous loans to farmers. He also recalled that some 10 agencies had been set up to ensure the agricultural development of the most important river basins such as the famous Basin Development Authorities of the Sokoto-Rima River, Hadejia-Jama River, Chad Basin, Upper Benue River, Lower Benue River, Cross River, Anambra-Imo River, Niger River, Ogun-Oshun River and Benin River.

Agriculture, therefore, is on the list of priorities, Afolabi said, and foreign investors in this sector would be welcome. The encouragement provided by the government to draw in assistance is quite generous and unequalled in any other local economic sector.

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The ambassador emphasized, on the other hand, the boosting of technological transfers and cited laws and regulations aimed at promoting manufacturing industries, such as the Industrial Development Act, through which customs fees are lowered to encourage pioneering industries and protect new industries; the Import Duties Relief Act, which allows a company manufacturing for exports to obtain generous postponements of income tax payments; the Approved Users Scheme, which enables manufacturing companies to import raw materials either entirely customs free or at lower customs rates; the Customs Duties/Dumped or Subsidized Goods Act, which protects local industries from the competition of goods either subsidized or imported; and the Customs Regulations (draw back) Act, according to which, under certain circumstances, importers could request a reimbursement of customs fees on imported goods.

Further, the ambassador specified, investors have the possibility to hire foreign agents familiar with management and techniques considered scarce in the country. Infrastructural installations may be even supplied to them in the various industrial areas. The federal government created the Nigeria Development Bank strictly for such investors.

Afobali also emphasized the importance which Nigeria attaches to the completion of the two future important metallurgical complexes in Ajaokuta and Sapele, which will lead to the development of a number of other activities. He mentioned the success of the automotive vehicles assembly plants already in operation, specifically that of Peugeot in Kaduna. The country would like to see other such industries developed and the speedy development of the domestic manufacturing of their spare parts, including engine parts. In 1980 incentives will be provided to this effect.

The ambassador discussed the housing and road construction sectors in which extensive efforts will be made along with the development of port equipment, in addition to the quite appreciable results already achieved at Tin Can Island, in particular.

He also spoke of the rich mineral resources of the country and announced that as of 1980 uranium exports could be developed substantially from the viewpoint of their impact on the economy. However, he pointed out that lime extraction was still inadequate and that the seven existing cement plants were far from satisfying consumer demand.

The subject of the investment of Nigerian capital in enterprises, the Indegenisation Decrees of 1972-1977, he stated that his government considered to go even further in reserving an even higher share of the capital for Nigerians, specifically in the so far least developed sectors.

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However, discussing preembarkation control of goods by the Societe Generale de Surveillance in Geneva, he did not conceal the fact that Nigeria had had "an unfortunate experience" in this area. "It was found out," he said in substance, "that some goods had been charged at over 150 percent of their value and that some machines manufactured 100 years ago had been imported in the country as brand new."

Finally, after discussing some other problems such as technological and university training, the Nigerian diplomat emphasized the repeatedly stated wish of his country to develop bilateral cooperation by Belgium. He recalled, on this subject, the numerous steps taken by the Lagos government in 1978 and 1979, and, specifically, the visit paid to Brussels in October 1978 of Mr Adewoye, federal commissioner for economic development of the Obasanjo government (MTM, 20 October 1978, p 2,78<sup>e</sup>).

He acknowledged that his actions had been disappointing. He even specified that the convention on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation, drafted by the federal government and submitted more than a year ago to the Belgian government, had still not been met with any response.

This lack of interest on the part of Belgium in Nigeria, one could recall, had been the subject of lively regrets last year expressed by the Belgian Embassy in Lagos in a long note which attempted to explain the situation and whose substance had been published in our issue of 14 July 1979 on page 1,929.

However, the December 1978 decision adopted by the two countries to organize a joint commission for the development of their business relations, particularly in the private sector, could have been used as a prelude to other developments on the governmental level.

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SENEGAL

#### BRIEFS

NEW RURAL COMMUNITIES--Three departments of northern Senegal have just been divided up into 28 rural communities, the regional development committee announced on 9 January. With the five areas of Senegal's center, west and south already endowed with communities, the total of the latter will henceforth come to 284. There will only remain doing the same for Senegal's eastern area. The creation in 1972 of the rural community system responded to the will to "decentralize" the government through the "responsible participation by the rural population in its own development. Its purpose was to avoid having the government cut off from reality, a cutting off that runs the risk of degenerating into a crisis. Each community is directed by an elected rural council having the authority to share out the use of lands in the national domain and to undertake activities of its own choice provided they do not conflict with the national development plan. Up to now these choices have in particular involved water and health. The chairman of the rural council is an officer with civil status and his work, like that of the other councilors, is unpaid. Financing the actions undertaken by the rural communities is covered by taxes, the main one being the rural tax, through state credits when major work is involved and through funds from bodies such as UNICEF. Up to now in the rural communities already having councils, the Socialist Party in power has 250 councils and the Senegalese Democratic Party heads six of them. The rural communities are still suffering from tight budgets and certain administrative delays, but the experiment seems to profit from the rural population's interest. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 193] 8094

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PETROLEUM, IRON FOR HORIZON 1985--In his New Year's message, President Senghor, foreseeing another difficult year for the developing countries, appealed to the Senegalese to unite to meet the challenges of drought, increased petroleum prices, inflation, and laxity. After stressing that Senegal will begin exploitation of offshore petroleum and its iron deposits with the Horizon 1985 plan, that 13 dams will be constructed by 2020, President Senghor declared he felt sure that if the Senegalese will remain united behind these orientations and priorities, per capita income in Senegal will rise to \$800 by the year 2000. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 78] 8860

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS--On 4 January of this year, Mr Ousmane Seck, Senegal's minister of economy and finance, and Mr Roland-Billecart, director general of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, signed four conventions totaling 1,892 million CFA francs. The first, for 320 million CFA, will be used to stockpile grain to improve security against famine. The second, for 240 million, will finance a program for forest protection, maintenance, and extension. The third is to be used for village waterworks. The fourth, for 1,012 million CFA francs, is to be used to establish a National Institute for Rural Development at Thies. These four conventions bring the total of Central Fund grants to Senegal since 1975 to 32 billion CFA francs. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 78] 8860

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SOMALIA

NEED TO REESTABLISH BALANCE OF POWER STRESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 996, 6 Feb 80 pp 38, 39

[Article by Marc Yared: "The 'Old Man's' Fears"]

[Excerpts] At 60, Gen Siad Barre presides since October 1969 on the destinies of Somalia. For most of his countrymen, who call him familiarly the "Old Man," he remains a symbol of national unity and social and cultural progress.

There is no doubt that Siad Barre is speaking a new language. He categorically affirmed in October 1978: "We are not going to abandon scientific socialism." This desire for "moderation," for "detente," for a dialog with the West has been manifested by the head of the Somalian state for some time in all fields.

Does Somalia still claim the Ogaden, northern Kenya and Djibouti as integral parts of its own territory?

"We do not have any territorial ambitions. The Somali Republic's territory is sufficiently vast. The country is far from being overpopulated... As for Djibouti, I had personally insisted with my colleagues nearly 3 years ago that the formula which would produce independence for Djibouti be adopted. We are grateful to the French intelligentsia for the campaign it conducted to achieve independence. Today, we fully approve of the establishment of ties--especially cultural ones--between Djibouti and France. It is a source of enrichment for all Somalians."

"As for the Ogaden, it is a territory colonized by Ethiopia. It is enough to witness the flight of hundreds of thousands of people who are attempting to escape Addis Ababa's repression. Even on this point, Somalia has no claims. We simply believe that the people of the Ogaden should achieve self-determination. If they opt for a fusion or a federation with Ethiopia, or for the establishment of an independent state, it is their business, not ours."

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"In relation with Kenya, we wish to have the best relations with this country. I said so to the Kenyan president, Arap Moi, when we met in Taif in Saudi Arabia some months ago. If there is a problem, it must be solved between the Kenyan Government and the population of the NFD (Northern Frontier District)."

To relinquish, or at least relegate to the background the traditional irredentist themes coincides with the desire for domestic "detente."

For President Siad Barre, the adoption of a constitution (approved in August through a referendum) at the beginning of 1979, the 30 December election--for the first time in 10 years--of a National Assembly are important steps in the road toward normalization. The regime established by the October 1969 revolution now has legitimate foundations.

Moderation abroad, normalization within; these choices seem unavoidable to the Somalian authorities. Indeed, two threats have appeared on the horizon since 1979. One million refugees from the Ogaden and the Ethiopian provinces of Bale and Sidamo have converged on Somalia. The burden is quite heavy for this country, one of the poorest in the world.

The break that has occurred in the balance of forces in the Horn of Africa, to the benefit of Ethiopia which possesses six times the number of tanks and four times the number of soldiers of Somalia, is a mortal danger for this country. At least, this is President Siad Barre's opinion; according to him, "a scenario similar to that which allowed Vietnam to invade Cambodia at the beginning of 1979 cannot be excluded." The head of state notes that Addis Ababa first created a "puppet" organization (the Somali Salvation Front) which has no national implantation, but could serve as a pretext for an Ethiopian invasion. Already, the Addis Ababa air force has been bombarding Somali towns. This could well be the first step in a strategy whose aim is control of the entire Horn of Africa by Ethiopia... The reasons, then, for this pro-Western "veering" in Somalia, which may grant military bases to the United States, are evident. The balance of forces must be reestablished.

But President Siad Barre is cautious. While waiting for Western support to materialize, and aiming at preserving his country's independence by avoiding an exclusive dialog with the United States, he is acting prudently vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Never once during our talk did he openly attack Moscow. He limited himself to referring, in vague terms, to "the superpowers' policies which are attempting to divide the Africans and destabilize their regimes."

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SWAZILAND

ECONOMIC SITUATION REVIEWED IN BANK REPORT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jan 80 p 41

[Report: "Inflation Threatens Economic Development"]

[Text] Recently the Barclays Bank of Swaziland Ltd. drafted a report on the economic situation in Swaziland for the Abecor European bank group.

The document emphasizes the severity of inflation which reach 12 percent annually for the fiscal year which ended on 30 June 1979 and which may be even higher (15 percent perhaps) over the next fiscal year.

Let us recall in this connection that Swaziland's currency is the lilangeni (emalangen in the plural; the currency symbol is E.) which is based on the rand and is within the rand zone.

The danger of further inflation is caused by two main reasons: the 1978-1979 drought which would reduce the amount of agricultural goods and higher petroleum prices.

In June 1979 Swaziland's foreign exchange reserves were assessed at \$124.7 million, of which 18.6 million South African rands in circulation in the country.

The GNP (gross national product) was assessed at E 272.5 million in March 1977, as against E 146.5 million in 1973-1974 (at market prices). This advancement covers the 1976-1977 crisis which followed a drop in the prices of sugar and cellulose, the two main Swaziland export items.

According to the Barclays Bank agriculture and forestry continued to play a motor role in the economy, accounting for 30 percent of the GNP, 75 percent of the national manpower employment, and 70 percent of export earnings.

A rural development program (RDA) was drafted by the government for the sake of raising the living standard of the average peasant who subsists on his own resources and to protect natural resources. It emphasizes

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the need to grow cash crops (cotton, tobacco, citrus fruits, and vegetables) in order to reduce the disparity between town and country living standards.

Sugarcane production in the fiscal year which ended on 30 April totaled 2.24 million tons, or 313,000 tons over and above the previous year. Sugar production reached a record 247,800 tons (the previous record set in 1976-1977 was 224,420 tons). Sugar sales on the domestic market totaled about 24,000 tons and exports totaled 213,400 tons (of which 122,670 tons to the EEC and 90,740 tons to the United States).

The expected sugar production for 1979-1980 is 257,000 tons. A third national sugar production project should be operational in 1980, totaling 9,000 hectares of irrigated cane crops and a refinery which should reach its full capacity of 126,000 tons of sugar in 1982-1983.

In 1978-1979, 19,000 hectares were planted in cotton by over 4,000 farmers; 22,280 tons of unginned cotton were produced in 1978. However, the drought reduced the 1979 crop despite an increase of areas under cultivation. Timber, which covers 12,000 hectares, made possible sales worth E 37.6 million worth of timber processing products in 1977 (of which E 27.8 exported outside southern Africa). Sales of construction lumber accounted for E 5.2 million in 1977 (E 4.7 million from exports).

Mining output has declined considerably (40 percent of the 1967 exports but only 15 percent in 1977). However, the country contains important reserves including at least 200 million tons of coal.

As to industry, the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS) which is a juridical person and is financially autonomous, invested about E 7.5 million in industry, of which nearly E 3 million in the construction of industrial premises. Currently it is emphasizing agroindustrial projects and is conducting studies of projects such as the building of a tractor plant or various units for the processing of cotton, leather, and furs and of sugarcane byproducts. The Matsapha industrial zone will be developed. The purpose of the Small Enterprises Development Company Ltd. (SEDCO), a branch of the NIDCS, is to create small industry jobs in rural areas and reduce the dependence on external sources for common consumer goods.

The government's development program calls for an increase in agricultural output of 6.5 percent between 1978-1979 and 1982-1983, and a 70 percent industrial production increase within the same period, in terms of real value. This would require a seven percent annual growth of the real GNP.

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The budget for the fiscal year which will end on 31 March 1980 calls for expenditures totaling E 169 million and income not exceeding E 115 million. The deficit of the 1978-1979 fiscal year was assessed at E 29 million.

The 1977 balance of payments was favorable (E 16 million), as against a deficit of E 7 million in 1976. The trade balance remains favorable: E 168 million in exports in 1976 and 157 million in 1977 as against, respectively, 127 and 142 million in imports. The 1977 main exports were sugar, cellulose, asbestos, iron ore, cotton, fruits, timber products, and meat. Imports covered mainly transportation equipment, manufactured goods, petroleum, food products, and chemicals; 96 percent of imports came from South Africa.

In 1979 Swaziland concluded a revised customs agreement which ties it to South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho. The customs fees are collected by South Africa which then gives its partners their share. Swaziland's customs fees are based on those of South Africa. However, for a period of eight years Swaziland can add additional fees to protect its newly developing industries. In 1977-1978 E 46.8 million, or nearly one-half of the state's earnings, came from customs fees.

At the end of 1977 Swaziland's foreign debt totaled \$112.6 million.

Emphasizing, in the conclusion of its study, the danger of inflation, the Barclays Bank notes as well that the development of the private sector in Swaziland has remained very low.

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TANZANIA

POSSIBLE BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

LD251305 London THE GUARDIAN in English 25 Feb 80 p 6 LD

[Martha Honey Dispatch: "Nyerere Ready To Break UK Links"]

[Text] Dar-es-Salaam--Tanzania may be preparing to break diplomatic relations with Britain over its implementation of the Rhodesian peace agreement, according to diplomatic sources here.

These sources said President Nyerere recalled the Tanzanian high commissioner to London, Mr Amon Nsekela, on Saturday "Not just for routine discussions but to serve notice on the British that the situation in Rhodesia is extremely serious."

President Nyerere, who in recent days has summoned, on separate occasions, the British, EEC and Nordic countries' ambassadors to Tanzania, is said to have told them that the situation in Rhodesia is more serious than at the time the whites declared UDI in 1965. Tanzania broke diplomatic relations in 1965 to protest against Britain's inaction in Rhodesia.

According to these sources, President Nyerere told the diplomats, "that at the time of UDI, Britain did nothing to stop Ian Smith. But now it's worse-- Britain is actively siding with the whites."

The sources say that President Nyerere listed a number of what he says are British violations of the Lancaster house agreement, including the continuing presence of South African troops in Rhodesia, the failure to confine the Rhodesian auxiliary and regular army forces and the recruitment of new Rhodesian military forces, and harassment, intimidation and threats against the patriotic front parties.

President Nyerere is reportedly also angered by a letter he received last week from Mrs Margaret Thatcher in which she supported the governor in Rhodesia, Lord Soames. Further, President Nyerere is reported to have said that Mrs Thatcher justified the deployment of the auxiliary and Rhodesian forces by saying that under the peace agreement they were to be confined only until the patriotic forces reached their assembly points.

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President Nyerere argued that under the Lancaster house agreement, the military forces of both sides were to be confined throughout the ceasefire period.

Finally, President Nyerere is said to be annoyed that the British turned down his request that United Nations Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, go immediately to Rhodesia to evaluate how the peace agreement is being implemented. "President Nyerere accused the British of banning Waldheim," said one source.

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TANZANIA

INSTITUTE OF RURAL PLANNING ESTABLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 93

[Text] On 4 January the Tanzanian National Assembly adopted a legislative proposal establishing an Institute of Rural Development Planning to be situated at Dodoma, Tanzania's future capital.

The institute will provide training courses for local authorities and for government workers. Its objective is to create a body of specialists in rural planning who will be called to work in collaboration with the villagers. School teachers will also be instructed in planning at the Institute.

The vote on the law indicates a check to the policy of the 1975 "villagisation" program of 1975 (Ujamaa Villages and Villages Act) which gave the villages autonomy in the context of a development they were not capable of carrying out or even to understand due to a lack of technical knowledge.

The appointment of village managers by the authorities has not settled the problems related to the uprooting of the population. The Tanzanian authorities are counting on the creation of the Arusha Institute to set the lead for the type of development they have thought through for the Tanzanian peasants. Perhaps they are forgetting that the human spirit, once impregnated with traditions closely related to a style of living, is not an easily molded clay.

The National Assembly also adopted three other legislative proposals creating research institutes as follows:

The Serengeti Wildlife Research Institute will have full responsibility for all the research of this type now under various other ministries.

The Tanzania Forestry Research Institute will be for the development and conservation of forests.

The Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute, this type of research was under the Economic Community of East Africa before it fell apart in 1977.

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72

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TANZANIA

REPORT ON TAZARA CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 93

[Text] Last December a report which had cost Finnish experts some 7 million shillings to put together was presented to the Tanzanian minister of the interior. It concerned the "Tazara corridor," the zones on either side of the Tanzania-Zambia railway. The three volume work is titled "Regional Physical Plan of the Tazara Corridor," and contains socioeconomic studies of its prospects and potential up to 1995.

First of all, the report evaluates the arable character of irrigated land near the railway line: this category would include 320,000 hectares in the Kilombero Valley (Morogoro region), 120,000 hectares in the plan of Usangu (Mbeya region), 50,000 hectares in the Rufiji basin and 40,000 hectares around Wami (Bogamoyo region).

The zone, defined as an 2,226,000 sq km area (25.2 percent of the national territory), is the principal rice producing area of the country. According to the report, 62,000 hectares could be given over to production of this commodity by 1995.

Currently, only 5 percent of the total area of the corridor is cultivated (11,000 sq km). There are 75,000 sq km of woodlot and 109,000 sq km of natural prairie reserved for pasture or for lying fallow.

The authors of the report estimate that agricultural production in the corridor could increase from the current 2 million tons to 4.3 million by 1995. Eighty percent of this tonnage would be consumed locally. Export commodities could go from 170,000 tons to 800,000 tons in 1995.

Nevertheless, they note that Ludena district is "an area of problems, agriculturally speaking," and a solution should be found to the too great density of population around Tukuyu, a zone which is, however, fertile.

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As for the industrial potential of the corridor, the report estimates that Morogoro, possibly employing 17,000 in industry by 1995, is the center of future development. Mbeya with 15,000 jobs would become the town for heavy industry in metals, while Iringa would be turned to agro-industry. Mining would be less important in the corridor, concerned mostly with the extraction of mica, kaolin and coal.

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TANZANIA

RISE IN FOOD PRICES--The Tanzanian Government announced on 13 January an increase in retail selling prices of certain foodstuffs to go into effect immediately. As a result, a kilo of rice goes up from 3.5 shillings to 5.35; sugar from 6 to 7 shillings a kilo; wheat flour from 10.65 shillings to 11.70 for a 2-kilo package. These increases will be borne by the most advantaged social classes, President Nyerere stated, and he announced that at the same time a kilo of sembe (cornflour) was reduced from 1.75 to 1.25 shillings to ease the burden on modest income families. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 209] 8094

'IDA' PORT MODERNIZATION LOAN--IDA [International Development Association], an affiliate of the World Bank, approved the granting to Tanzania of credits amounting to nearly 20,000,000 shillings (about \$2.5 million) for the financing of a project to modernize the port of Dar es Salaam. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 209] 8094

NEW MINISTRY CREATED--On 5 January President Nyerere authorized creation of a new ministry, economy and development planning, directly under presidential authority. Prof Kighoma Malima, member of the Central Committee of CCM [Revolutionary Party] was named a state minister to head the new department. The same day the president also named Mr Ibrahim Kaduma, vice chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam, as minister of commerce. The former minister of commerce, Mr Alphonse Rulegura, was named minister of rural habitation and urban development, replacing Mr Tabitha who will be taking over the Ministry of National Education. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 92] 8860

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UGANDA

EUROPEAN AID SINCE FALL OF AMIN DADA EXPLAINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 151

[Text] In response to a written question, the Commission of the European Communities has provided the following information concerning European aid to Uganda since the collapse of the Amin Dada regime (JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES, 9 January 1980):

1. Following the change in regime in Uganda, the Commission, fully aware of the need immediately to provide effective assistance to the Ugandan people, adopted a certain number of measures that are indispensable given the situation currently being experienced by that country.

2. On 23 April 1979, the Commission decided, under the terms of article 59 of the Lome Convention, to grant Uganda emergency assistance in the amount of 300,000 ECU's (European currency units). That sum is intended to meet the population's most pressing needs. In addition to those funds, basic food products (35 tons of corned beef and 12 tons of dried fish) and medical supplies (beds, sheets, and blankets for hospitals) were purchased and distributed in Uganda between mid-May and the start of June 1979.

Additional emergency aid totaling 200,000 ECU's and intended for medical assistance to be provided by the African Medical and Research Foundation was approved on 2 July 1979. That aid will be used to finance medical equipment, medicines, vaccines, and educational material. It will also cover the expense of transportation and technical assistance.

Sizable food aid has also been granted to Uganda since April 1979 (950 tons of powdered milk, 300 tons of butter oil, and 400 tons of cereals).

3. On 5 July 1979, the Commission approved a short-term aid program totaling 18.5 million ECU's. This is an emergency assistance program whose purpose is to insure a rapid return to the normal operation of basic public services and to meet the most urgent needs of the main socioeconomic sectors. The immediate needs will thus be met in sectors such as agriculture (4 million ECU's), livestock (3.5 million), water (2 million), electricity (2 million),

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telecommunications (1.6 million), road repairs (2 million), education (0.5 million), and miscellaneous other sectors (2.9 million). The program is already underway.

4. In addition to the emergency aid and short-term aid mentioned above, the Commission is now considering the drawing up of a much more comprehensive community plan that will total about 50 million ECU's. Its purpose would be to stimulate the main sectors of the Ugandan economy.

The two last-mentioned programs are being financed by the indicative program for financial and technical cooperation, which was concluded under the Lome Convention but which was suspended in its essentials throughout the preceding regime.

European aid to Uganda is based on an action program drawn up last May after an EEC mission was sent to that country (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 June 1979, p 1501).

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